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 2
 Executive Summary 
 Over the past twenty-five years, the U.S. biotechnology industry has been one of 
the most prosperous and innovative segments of our economy.  One of the key 
developments which has allowed this growth has been the ability of research institutions, 
both public and private, to rely on the patent system to protect their lucrative intellectual 
property.  Accordingly, the number of patents granted for biotechnological inventions has 
skyrocketed, particularly on DNA sequences, proteins, instruments and other inventions 
which are known as “research tools”, products which can be used as inputs in further 
biomedical research.  Because of this patent protection, acquiring the rights to use these 
materials can be potentially time-consuming and expensive.   
This has led many observers, especially those in the academic community, to fear 
that research tool patents could stifle university biotechnology research, as many 
researchers would not have the time or financial resources to obtain the licenses to use 
these patented inventions.  Historically, researchers in university or other nonprofit 
settings were not greatly concerned about obtaining the necessary licenses or paying 
royalties because it was generally assumed that their work was covered under a common 
law “research use exemption”.  Since their work was not motivated by a commercial 
purpose, it was widely believed (and reflected by court opinion) that these researchers 
and their institutions were exempt from patent infringement suits.  However, in the 2002 
case of Madey v. Duke, the court found that, indeed, universities and their scientists could 
be sued for infringement for unauthorized use of patented research tools, even if their 
work contained no hint of commercial enterprise. 
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 This legal decision has caused many in the academic community to argue for a 
statutory research use exemption, which would protect academic research and allow 
scientists unfettered access to patented research tools.  Many have pushed for a broad 
statute, which would exempt a wide range of activities, including research performed 
with the patented invention, which, in theory, should increase university innovative 
output.  However, this type of exemption could severely impact the profits of 
biotechnology companies that produce these inventions, which could limit their ability to 
continue to produce new and better research tools.  To examine the consequences of this 
type of exemption, a two-pronged quantitative analysis was performed, analyzing the 
potential effects of a research with exemption on: 1) universities and 2) research tool 
companies. 
The cost-benefit analysis for universities showed that it appears likely that 
university innovation would increase as a result of the policy, primarily due to reduced 
spending on licensing fees and a freeing up of previously undoable lines of research that 
would likely accompany the implementation of the law.  The other portion of the 
quantitative analysis examined the stock performance of a group of biotechnology 
companies who should have been negatively impacted by a Supreme Court decision that 
essentially created a de facto research use exemption.  However, the analysis was 
inconclusive and unable to show that this de facto exemption had a statistically 
significant effect on the companies’ market valuation.   
In addition to this quantitative analysis, the consensus from most observers in the 
academic community is that the fears about the negative effects of biotechnology patents 
have largely gone unrealized.  Most researchers are not being impeded by patent and 
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 licensing hurdles, and even in the wake of the Madey decision, it appears that most firms 
are still willing to tolerate infringement on the part of universities to maintain friendly 
relationships with the academic community.  Therefore, a broad research with exemption, 
while marginally beneficial, might be ultimately unnecessary. 
Based on this reality and on international precedents, this paper concludes that it 
is more appropriate for Congress to enact a more limited exemption, which would permit 
research on a patented invention for the purposes of testing the claims of the patent, 
finding novel uses for the invention, or to find improvements or substitutions for the 
product.  The paper also finds that while many of the concerns about research tool patents 
have not yet materialized, it is essential that the federal government and academic 
institutions continue to monitor the effects of biotechnology patents to ensure that they 
are not impeding biomedical research in the noncommercial community.  Ultimately, it 
appears that the limited research on exemption crafted in this paper would benefit the 
United States; an assessment of the political situation in Congress, however, suggests that 
action in this area is unlikely for the foreseeable future.   
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 Introduction 
 This paper explores the possibility of creating a statutory research use exemption 
in United States patent code.  Calls for such legislation have come primarily in response 
to the great increase in patenting in the biotechnology, computing, and 
telecommunications sectors, particularly on inventions that function as inputs for further 
research.  Such patenting, many observers claim, could ultimately stifle downstream 
innovation, as academic and nonprofit researchers would not be able to access these vital 
technologies for use in their work.  Some in the academic field have claimed that a 
research use exemption is needed to mitigate these concerns, by shielding some 
researchers from patent infringement suits.  Without fear of a lawsuit, scientists, 
particularly those in the academic community, would have unfettered access to these 
patented inventions.  This project explores the source of the problem, the legislative 
options facing Congress, and the potential impact of codifying a research use exemption.  
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 1 puts the current situation into 
historical context by explaining changes in the biotechnology sector over the past twenty-
five years and the expansion of biotech patenting.  It also discusses the increased 
importance of patenting in universities and the spread of the university technology 
transfer model, which has made academic institutions key players in biotechnological 
innovation.  Finally, Section 1 examines the changing nature of the relationship between 
academia and industry, a link that will be essential to examining the need for and 
consequences of a research use exemption. 
Section 2 explores the history of the common law research use exemption in U.S. 
law.  First articulated in the 19th century, the common law research exemption became 
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 part of judicial dicta and survived until 2002, when two crucial court cases, Madey v. 
Duke and Merck v. Integra, altered the way the exemption was treated by the courts.  
Section 2 provides valuable insight into the history of the common law exemption, which 
can then inform the decisions made in crafting legislative alternatives. 
The scope of the problem is specified in Section 3, which explores the current 
climate of academic research.  Since arguments for a research exemption typically rest on 
the assumption that nonprofit research is being impaired, this section analyzes how much 
university research is being affected by patent and licensing issues, especially in light of 
the 2002 Madey decision. 
Section 4 defines the options facing Congress and develops a model for a 
reasonable statutory research use exemption that addresses the scope of the problem as 
laid out in Sections 1-3.  The section begins with a theoretical examination of exemption 
proposals and criteria for evaluating the merits of a statute.  Next, the section explores 
several specific examples of exemptions which are already in place in U.S. and foreign 
patent codes and serve as models for potential legislative action.  Finally, the section 
develops specific elements that could be incorporated into the legislation, based on U.S. 
and international precedents and recommendations from federal groups, foreign 
governments, and observers in the legal community. 
Based on sections 1-4, Section 5 performs a stakeholder analysis to determine the 
effects of a research use exemption.  Specifically, the section performs a quantitative 
analysis to estimate the effects of the legislation on innovative output.  The analysis is 
divided into two sections to examine the consequences for the two biggest stakeholders:  
1) universities; and 2) research tool companies.  The section also contains a political 
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 analysis, which explores the likelihood of Congress’s willingness to actually take up and 
adopt such a measure.  Based on these analyses, Section 6 offers a set of findings and 
recommendations for legislative action. 
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 Section 1 
 
The U.S. biotechnology industry over the past 25 years 
 
 
 
The past twenty-five years have seen the explosion of patenting and commercial 
activity in genomics and biotechnology.  While, clearly, technological progress has 
driven much of the growth in the sector, these increases can also be attributed to legal 
changes that encouraged the patenting of genomics-based discoveries and changes in the 
patenting behaviors of universities and other nonprofit entities.   
Changes in the legal framework 
The first change was the rise of the biotechnology industry, which began in the 
mid to late 1970s.  Suddenly, the promise of large profits and the corresponding influx of 
capital persuaded companies (and to a lesser extent, universities) to find ways to quickly 
commercialize their research.  This typically meant seeking patent protection for their 
potentially lucrative discoveries.  Several changes in the U.S. legal system supported an 
increased propensity to patent.  The first was the 1980 Supreme Court decision in the 
case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which held that genetically modified organisms could 
be patented (Murray, 2006).  The Court found that even living things, if substantially 
altered by humans, could meet the criteria for an invention, which included “anything 
under the sun that is made by man”1.   Thus, DNA-based patents (such as therapeutic 
forms of naturally occurring proteins or modified organisms for the production of 
medicines) were now acceptable as “inventions”. 
                                                 
1 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, at 309 
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 A second change focused on the way in which cases involving patents were 
adjudicated in federal courts.  In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) was established, unifying patent dispute cases under a single, federal jurisdiction 
(Mowery, Nelson et al., 2001).  In cases where one party sought to have another party’s 
patent invalidated or revoked, the CAFC soon gained a reputation for generally siding 
with patent holders, establishing a presumption in their favor, a reversal of prior federal 
appeals court precedent.  Rai points out that the Court has taken an “expansive approach 
to patent eligibility while relaxing the stringency of standards for patent protection, such 
as utility and nonobviousness” (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003).   These changes in the 
judiciary meant that inventors were now more likely to be granted patents on naturally 
occurring DNA products and that those patents were more likely to be upheld, if 
challenged in federal court. 
University technology transfer 
Changes in U.S. patent law and policy did not just encourage commercial 
enterprises to commercialize their inventions.  Congress also sought to increase 
innovation by creating incentives for patenting and licensing discoveries made in 
universities and other federally-funded institutions.  The concern among many lawmakers 
and others in the research community was that most discoveries with potential social 
benefit were going undeveloped or ignored because no one would invest in 
commercializing the results of such research (Eisenberg, 1996).  The reason was simple:  
discoveries (and any patents filed on them) made using federal funds generally reverted 
to the federal government.  Without ownership of the intellectual property rights, most 
companies would not invest the capital needed to bring the products to market.  The fear 
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 that many important inventions were being ignored was legitimate; in the early 1980s, 
only 5 percent of patents owned by the U.S. government were actively being used 
(Schacht, 2000).   
Congress sought to increase innovation by granting ownership of the patents to 
those institutions which made discoveries using federal dollars.  With the potentially 
lucrative patent rights, these institutions would be in a position to commercialize their 
discoveries or license them to corporate partners.  The first of these laws was the 
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, which encouraged government research 
laboratories to actively patent and attempt to commercialize their findings and made 
“technology transfer an integral part of the research and development responsibilities” 
(Eisenberg, 1996).  Some federal agencies had already made licensing a priority; this 
policy made tech transfer an important aim across the board (Eisenberg, 1996).  The 
second of these policy changes was the Bayh-Dole Act, which gave universities and other 
federally-funded research institutions ownership over patents filed on their inventions.  
This was particularly important to research universities, where most discoveries came in 
the form of “basic research”, far upstream of commercial products.  Colyvas points out 
that, generally, “university research results of potential use in industry were embryonic 
inventions requiring a lot of follow on work in industry…it often facilitated technology 
transfer, and sometimes was necessary for it, if the university took out a patent on the 
invention” (Colyvas, Crow et al., 2002). 
The Bayh-Dole Act had the intended effect of increasing university patenting, a 
trend which continues today.  Universities were granted just 583 patents in 1985.  By 
1998, that number had jumped to 3,151 (Cohen, Walsh et al., 2002).  In the fiscal year 
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 2004, members of the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) reported 
filing for more than 11,000 patents.2  This increased patent activity was also above and 
beyond increases in patenting in general, as measured by U.S. patents issued each year.  
Rai points out that university patenting increased by a factor of ten between 1979 and 
1997, while the number of U.S. patents granted overall doubled (Rai and Eisenberg, 
2003).   
In order to capitalize on their patents, universities began to form their own 
technology transfer divisions.  While some institutions, such as Stanford, had previously 
had offices which specialized in patenting and licensing matters, the creation of dedicated 
tech transfer units became standard for most major research institutions.  In 1980, there 
were only 25 universities that had such offices; just a decade later, there were 200 (Cohen 
and Walsh, 2000).  The trend continued to grow throughout the 1990s, and even spread to 
include technology managers abroad.  By 2006, AUTM had more than 3600 members, 
representing 350 universities and other nonprofit research centers in 45 countries.3  These 
university tech transfer offices greatly increased the efficiency of the patenting process 
and the overall output of patents and licenses.  From 1975 to 1990, the ratio of patents to 
R&D investment increased from 57 granted patents per billion dollars of R&D to 96 
patents per billion dollars of research investment (Mowery, Nelson et al., 2001).   
These gains reflected the increased savvy of technology transfer offices, which 
became more skilled in soliciting invention disclosures from researchers and more 
successful in capitalizing on the commercial potential of their patents.  These trends 
continued throughout the 1990s.  In 1991, just over one-fourth of invention disclosures 
                                                 
2 www.autm.org/about
3 http://www.autm.net/about/
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 resulted in a new patent application (26 percent); by 2002, half of all invention 
disclosures led to the filing of a patent application (NAS, 2004).  Between 1991 and 
2000, licensing surveys conducted by AUTM showed an 84 percent increase in invention 
disclosures, a 238 percent increase in new patent applications, a 161 percent increase in 
the number of licensing agreements, and a 520 percent increase in the amount of royalties 
collected from patents (Thursby and Thursby, 2003).    
As technology transfer has become an integral part of the research university, it 
has fostered an increasing amount of collaboration between academic institutions and 
commercial firms and blurred the traditional lines between “basic” and “applied” 
research.  The National Research Council (NRC) claimed that “the growing propensity of 
universities to enter into collaborative R&D arrangements with business and government 
laboratories has been a major trend in the R&D environment over the past two decades” 
(NRC, 2005).  As federal funding in many areas of research has decreased, 
nongovernmental sources, including commercial entities, have filled the funding gaps.  
Mowery reports that “in 1970, federal funds accounted for 70.5 percent of university 
performed research and industrial support 2.6 percent; by 1997, federal funds accounted 
for 59.6 percent of totally university research and industry’s contribution had increased to 
7.1 percent” (Mowery, Nelson et al., 2001).  In absolute terms, between the late 1960s 
and 2002, overall industry support for academic research and development increased by 
900 percent (NAE, 2003).  
DNA patents:  a potential disaster? 
The increases in university patenting have been skewed heavily in the direction of 
DNA based patents.  While overall university patenting has increased, their gains in the 
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 field of genomics have been particularly impressive, with academic institutions 
accounting for a larger share of these patents than in other areas (Sampat, 2004).  In 
2003, universities were responsible for more than 15 percent of the genomics patents 
issued, whereas they were awarded just 6 percent of total patents issued in that year 
(Sampat, 2004).  Universities and other noncommercial centers have emerged as leaders 
in genomic research and their gains are reflected in the high proportion of patents in 
therapeutics, proteins, genes, sequences and other genetically based inventions owned by 
universities.  A recent survey of DNA patents conducted by Pressman, et al. (the most 
thorough analysis of this segment of patents) found that 13 of the top 30 entities with the 
most number of DNA based patents were nonprofit academic institutions (Pressman, 
Burgess et al., 2006).  The study also found that overall, nearly one fourth of all DNA 
patents (22 percent) were controlled by nonprofit institutions, leading the authors to 
comment that research universities and other academic centers are “major players in the 
patenting and licensing of DNA based inventions” (Pressman, Burgess et al., 2006).   
The main problem with these DNA patents is, as Professor Arti Rai points out, 
that they “do not cover commercial end products, but rather fundamental research 
discoveries and research tools” (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003).  A “research tool” can simply 
be defined as any “product or method whose purpose is use in the conduct of research” 
(Newman, 2003).  This class of tools can include instruments (like microscopes or 
lasers), processes (like DNA sequencing techniques or the polymerase chain reaction), or 
materials (such as DNA segments, nucleotides, proteins, or molecules).  These have 
become increasingly prevalent in university patenting.  For instance, in Columbia 
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 University’s patent portfolio, one of the most lucrative in U.S. academia, more than half 
are research tools (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003).   
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Figure 1. DNA Patents Issued 1971 to 2005.  DNA patent counts determined by search 
of the DNA Patent Database (http://dnapatents.georgetown.edu), which contains patents 
with one or more claims based on DNA or RNA.  Source: (Pressman, Burgess et al., 
2006). 
 
Biological research tools represent a unique and troublesome class of patents.  
These tools have become more commonplace in molecular biology and genomic 
research, and are often required to undertake even basic, noncommercial research.  
Restricting or limiting use can hamper downstream research, which can stifle further 
genomic discoveries.  Some commentators have claimed that the increases on patented 
research tools is creating a “patent thicket, a dense web of overlapping intellectual 
property rights that a company [or university] must hack its way through…With 
cumulative innovation and multiple blocking patents, stronger patent rights can have the 
perverse effect of stifling, not encouraging innovation” (Shapiro, 2001).  Josh Sarnoff, a 
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 professor of law at American University, claims that restricted access to research tools 
may take four forms:  “1) a refusal to license; 2) increased or insurmountable costs; 3) 
increased time in licensing negotiations and less time in the lab; and 4) onerous licensing 
offers that discourage licensing” (Sarnoff, 2002).  We will consider the first three of these 
potential concerns in turn.  
Refusal to license 
All patents provide the patent owner with the right to restrict use of his or her 
patent.  Rochelle Dreyfuss, from New York University argues that the “problem with 
research tools is that the patentee now has a right to say ‘no’, not say, ‘give me two 
dollars’, has a right to say ‘no, you can’t do that research’” (NAS, 2004).  Hoffmann 
points out that the right to exclude (the cornerstone of the patent system) normally does 
not interfere, but has the potential to have dire consequences in genomic research:  
“Proponents of the patent system assume that most patent holders will act rationally to 
maximize the economic utility of their inventions by freely granting licenses.  Although 
this has been true in most industries, it may not always be the case in biotechnology, 
where innovations ‘stand on the shoulders’ of previous inventions.  Patent holders are not 
obligated to license their technologies to competing researchers:  they may refuse to grant 
licenses or hold out against the tantalizing possibility of extraordinary future profits” 
(Hoffman, 2004).  Research may be forestalled due to a simple inability to obtain licenses 
or materials from patent owners.   
Insurmountable licensing fees 
Assuming researchers can obtain access to the intellectual property rights, there is 
also the potential problem of excessive licensing fees. Research involving patented 
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 genomic tools often requires multiple inputs.  Often, each separate input (a protein, 
sequence, technique, etc) is covered by a different patent, held by a different owner.  If 
each of these requires a separate licensing fee, a researcher would have to pay multiple 
rights holders to run a single experiment, which can increase the cost of doing research.  
Such “royalty stacking” could be render entire fields of research prohibitively expensive.  
“Transaction costs mount quickly”, Rai comments, “when the basic research discoveries 
necessary for subsequent work are owned not by one entity, but by a number of different 
entities” (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003).   
Delays resulting from licensing negotiations 
As nonprofit institutions become more patent savvy, projects may be delayed until 
universities are able to obtain the proper intellectual property rights.  Particularly with 
projects involving multiple patented tools, “it becomes more difficult for researchers 
working on complex projects to amass the necessary authorizations from upstream patent 
holders” (Weschler, 2004).  However, often IP issues are an afterthought for researchers 
and are not considered until projects have been substantially planned or are already 
underway, leading to the situation where “unanticipated need to negotiate licenses before 
initiating or while in the midst of research projects may forestall or seriously disrupt 
ongoing research” (Keyes, 2002).   
While technology transfer and the boom in DNA-based patents have led to 
explosive growth in the biotechnology and genomics sectors, they have brought with 
them the danger of potentially deterring subsequent research.  Section 3 of this paper 
examines the extent to which these possible hindrances are actually playing out in the 
research community.   
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 The next part of this section explores another key development in the biomedical 
research community over the past two decades:  the increasingly commercial role played 
by universities and their changing interactions with industrial partners. 
University/industrial relations:  an “uneasy” partnership? 
As universities are becoming major players in the world of DNA patenting and 
licensing, the traditional lines that once clearly separated “basic”, “noncommercial”, or 
“academic” work and “applied”, “commercial”, or “industrial” research have become 
blurred to the point that such labels are almost completely useless.  Whereas universities 
and academic institutions were once primarily purchasers or licensees of technology, 
today they are just as likely to own the patent rights to lucrative research tools and to earn 
money from royalties.  This shift has had implications for the interactions between 
universities and corporate entities.  Mowery, et al. illustrate that “[i]n some fields, such as 
research materials or tools, university and industrial researchers now are competitors as 
much or more so than collaborators, and industry researchers are often required to obtain 
licenses to use patented university research results.  Facing such demands from 
universities, industrial research managers see no reason why they should not make 
similar demands on universities” (Mowery, Nelson et al., 2004).   
And yet, it is still very much in industry’s interest to cooperate with the academic 
community, to whom companies turn for employees and consultants, as well as research 
findings and business partners (Sandelin, 2006).  Therefore, companies are also wary not 
to force universities into licenses which they may see as onerous or overly burdensome.  
This balance between securing profits from valuable licenses and maintaining good 
relations with universities has resulted in what one author has deemed an “uneasy” 
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 partnership (Cohen, Florida et al., 1998).  This somewhat precarious situation is summed 
up by Cristina Weschler:  “Due to the unique working relationship that exists between 
universities and industry, one characterized as much by cooperation and interdependence 
as by competition, it is often in companies’ interests to come to a working 
arrangement…” (Weschler, 2004).   
 These arrangements, or “working solutions” as they have been called by Wes 
Cohen, John Walsh and Ashish Arora, have been cited as a crucial factor in maintaining 
the functional relationships between industrial and academic entities (Walsh, Arora et al., 
2003).  One of these informal solutions involves the successful negotiation of licenses at 
reduced rates, a move which Weschler refers to as a “subtle form of price discrimination” 
(Weschler, 2004).  Companies are aware that tight grant budgets often make it infeasible 
to pay high licensing fees, especially when the projects in question constitute 
noncommercial or basic research, with little chance of profitability.  Other types of 
“working solutions” include “inventing around patents, going offshore…court challenges, 
and using the technology without a license (i.e. infringement)” (Walsh, Arora et al., 
2003).   
Infringement as a “working solution” 
It is this last method, infringement of patents by academic researchers, which has 
caused the most uneasiness among observers in both the nonprofit and commercial 
sectors.  The surveys of Walsh and Cohen have found infringement by university 
researchers (as well as corporate R&D personnel) to be a widespread, convenient way of 
avoiding the patent thicket problem.  After all, concerns over stalled licensing 
negotiations and burdensome royalties can be avoided entirely if the researcher simply 
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 forgoes the licensing process and uses the tool or material without formal permission.  
What is even more confounding is that biotechnology companies have traditionally 
tolerated such behavior, ignoring rampant infringement by the academic community.  
This “rational forbearance” has become the norm in university/industry relations (Cai, 
2004).  Why?  There are several reasons, including a lack of financial incentives and a 
willingness to stay on good terms with universities.  A university technology transfer 
interviewed by Walsh and Cohen summed up the reasons for condoning infringing 
behavior:  “Asserting against a university doesn’t make sense. First, there are no 
damages.  You cannot get injunctive relief and/or damages.  What have you gained?  
You’ve just made people mad.  Also, these firms are consumers of technology, as well.  
No one will talk to you if you sue.  We all scratch each others’ backs.  You will become 
an instant pariah if you sue a university” (Walsh, Arora et al., 2003).   
The lack of financial damages is a powerful disincentive to initiate an expensive 
lawsuit.  In suits against a university, “[m]onetary rewards could be reduced to zero for 
the same reasons that monetary relief is traditionally low in some situations:  the relevant 
user groups—in this case, noncommercial research institutions—lack resources to pay for 
the inputs they need.  Moreover, the economic value of the use—in this case, basic 
research—is highly speculative, and courts do not generally award speculative damages” 
(Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, 2004).  Another strong motivator is the desire for firms to 
maintain good relations with academic institutions.  Jon Sandelin, who works in 
Stanford’s tech transfer office, points out that companies are “very sensitive about their 
position with the university and they want to be seen as a good friend of the 
university…because they look to the university, in many cases, to outsource some of their 
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 R&D, and, of course, for hiring employees, and in building consulting relationships with 
faculty” (Sandelin, 2006).  Allowing infringement of a company’s patent is also a shrewd 
way for firms to reap the benefits of academic research work.  If a university researcher 
infringed a research tool patent and made a potentially lucrative discovery, the company 
which owned the patent rights on the tool could swoop in and cherry pick downstream 
profits.  This attitude was present in the surveys of Walsh and Cohen, who reported that 
“several respondents noted that they actually welcomed universities using their patented 
technologies because if the university discovers a new use, the patent holder is best 
positioned to exploit the innovation” (Walsh, Arora et al., 2003).   
These motives all provide strong incentives for companies to tolerate some level 
of infringement of their patents by the university community.  Even when companies 
have discovered specific cases of unauthorized use, they may send letters or name the 
culprits, but they have generally stopped short of bringing suit against individual 
researchers or their institutions.  One example occurred in 1995, in the case of Hoffmann 
La Roche v. Promega, a suit over the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a nearly 
ubiquitous genomic research tool.  As part of its case, pharmaceutical giant (and owner of 
the PCR patent) Roche supplied the court with the names of more than 200 researchers 
(including scientists from Harvard, M.I.T., the National Cancer Institute, and Stanford 
Medical School)  who, they claimed, had been infringing their patents by using the PCR 
technique without licenses.  However, the company refused to take any action against the 
researchers, choosing instead to go after the commercial entity which had enabled the 
infringement and supplied the unauthorized materials (Fore, Wiechers et al., 2006).  
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 Thus, infringement suits against universities are rare; one author claimed she could find 
just two instances of such a suit, one in 1996 and another in 2002 (Weschler, 2004).   
The reluctance of companies to sue scientists and universities has given them 
cause to avoid taking licenses and paying royalties in many instances.  Until 2002, 
academic researchers thought they might have another trump card that they could play if 
threatened by a lawsuit.  Because most of their work was noncommercial in nature and 
was used primarily for basic research purposes, many felt that their work was covered by 
a “research use exemption”, based in U.S. common law, which shielded them from 
claims of infringement.   
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 Section 2 
 
The common law research use exemption 
 
 
 
Origins of the common law exemption 
 
 The basis for a research use exemption is not grounded in statute.  Rather, it can 
be traced back to a dictum first articulated by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story in the 
1813 case of Whittemore v. Cutter 4, where he established the argument that some uses of 
patented inventions should not be labeled as infringement.  In his opinion, Justice Story 
wrote that “it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who 
constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of 
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its desired effects.”  Thus, in 
laying the foundation for an experimental use exemption, Justice Story defined two 
conditions under which otherwise infringing activities would be excused:  1) if the 
invention in question was used purely for “philosophical” research, or 2) if the accused 
infringer was attempting to verify the claims of the patent.   
 Later that same year, Justice Story added another condition to the experimental 
use exemption litmus test.  In the case of Sawin v. Guild5, he claimed that “[T]he making 
of a patented machine to be an offense…must be the making with an intent to use for 
profit...”  The idea that infringement should be tied to monetary gain was echoed by 
William Robinson in The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions, in a treatise entitled “No 
Act an Infringement unless it Affects the Pecuniary Interests of the Owner of the Patented 
                                                 
4 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D.Mass.1813) (No. 17,600) 
5 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D.Mass1813) (No. 12,391) 
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 Invention” (Karp, 1991). Up until the 1980s, U.S. courts generally continued to uphold 
this notion that infringement was contingent upon commercial interest (Karp, 1991).  
Absent any financial damage to the patent holder, the doctrine of de minimis non curate 
lex [the law is not concerned with trifles] was cited and courts were reluctant to award 
damages or grant injunctions against researchers or institutions whose work did not 
threaten the profitability of the patents they were accused of infringing (Karp, 1991).  
However, courts were far less willing to entertain the experimental use defense when the 
“research” activities contained even a hint of commercial enterprise.   
 In 1980, judicial precedent had already carved a narrowly-defined, common law 
exemption which seemed to shield most academic researchers, so long as their work 
avoided commercial incentives.  However, in that year, the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act, which encouraged universities to patent and commercialize discoveries, further 
blurred the line between “academic” and “industrial” research.  Important research 
discoveries and the promise of valuable intellectual property rights were now inextricably 
linked (Lee, 2004).  In addition to the passage of Bayh-Dole, the continued growth of the 
nascent biotechnology industry precipitated an increase in the assertion of intellectual 
property rights by courts, resulting in an even further narrowing of the informal 
experimental use exemption (Lee, 2004). 
This new attitude was reflected in the 1984 case of Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceuticals Co.6  Bolar, a generic drug manufacturer, had obtained and 
manufactured patented drug chemicals in order to do research needed to secure FDA 
approval of a generic version of Roche’s drug Dalmane.  However, the Court of Appeals 
found Bolar’s research constituted infringement because “Bolar’s intended 
                                                 
6 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
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 ‘experimental’ use [was] solely for business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy 
idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”   
As a result of this case, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly referred to as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), 
which allowed drug companies to perform research on patented materials (including 
drugs and medical devices) in order to obtain clinical data required for government 
approval (Thomas, 2004).  Specifically, the Hatch-Waxman Act amended 35 U.S.C. § 
271, by adding that infringement would be exempted when patented inventions were used 
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs…”7  However, 
this narrow exemption was limited to the arena of pharmaceuticals, and did not address 
the broader question of the use of patented research tools. 
Madey v. Duke 
In 2002, the ability for researchers to claim protection under a research use 
exemption was further restricted in a case involving Duke University. 8  The case 
centered on John Madey, a physics professor, who operated a lab at Duke containing 
laser technology for which he held patents.  After his resignation, Duke continued to 
operate the equipment for research and educational purposes.  When Madey sued for 
patent infringement, Duke claimed that since its use of the patented items was for basic 
research and was not commercially motivated, they were exempt from patent 
infringement under the experimental use defense.  A North Carolina District Court found 
                                                 
7 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
8 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
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 this argument sufficiently compelling to dismiss the infringement charges.9  However, 
upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals determined that the District Court’s interpretation 
of the experimental use exemption was “overly broad”, and that the defense was not 
applicable in this circumstance.10  The Federal Court found that even though Duke’s 
activity was not commercially motivated, the use of the patented materials “unmistakably 
further[ed] the institution’s legitimate business objectives, including educating and 
enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects.”  The important 
distinction made by the Court here was that the absence of economic incentive was no 
longer the key determinant in applying the experimental use doctrine: 
regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged 
in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in 
furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not 
solely for amusement, satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow 
and strictly defined experimental use defense.  Moreover, the profit 
or non-profit status of the user is not determinative. [emphasis 
added] 
 
This new precedent seemed to suggest that even scientists involved in basic 
research, far from industrial use, could still be held liable for infringement. 
Merck KGAA v. Integra 
 A more recent case also appears to have affected the scope of the research use 
exemption, this time concerning primarily the “Hatch-Waxman” exemption, 35 U.S.C. § 
271 (e) (1).  In the late 1980s, Merck KGAA (Merck) began sponsoring research at 
Scripps Research Institute to study angiogenesis (the formation of blood vessels) within 
tumors, using a class of proteins known as “RGD peptides” (Scalia, 2005).  These 
peptides had previously been discovered and patented by the biotech company Integra 
                                                 
9 266 F. Supp. 2d 420 (M.D.N.C., 2001) 
10 307 F. 3d 1351 
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 Lifesciences (Integra), who sued Merck for infringing the patents.  Merck claimed that it 
was exempt from patent infringement, because the research it sponsored was related to 
drug development and should therefore come under the protection of the Hatch-Waxman 
exemption, since the research produced data that would ultimately be required for 
submission to the FDA.   
However, both the District Court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found 
Merck’s argument unconvincing, finding that “the Scripps work sponsored by [Merck] 
was not clinical testing to supply information to the FDA, but only general biomedical 
research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds.”  In other words, the Merck 
research was too basic, too far upstream to be considered “reasonably related” to drug 
discovery.  Notably, though, Judge Pauline Newman in the Court of Appeals, issued a 
vehement dissenting opinion, arguing that Merck/Scripps’ activities should be immune 
under the traditional formulation of the common law exemption because their work 
involved “research into the science and technology disclosed in [the] patents” (Newman, 
2003).  In her dissent, Judge Newman claimed that the Merck/Scripps research was 
covered by the whole spectrum of exemptions, with the § 271 (e) (1) exemption picking 
up where the common law exemption ended:  “…the territory that the Scripps/Merck 
research traversed, from laboratory experimentation to development of data for 
submission to the FDA, was either exempt exploratory research, or was immunized by § 
271 (e) (1)” (Newman, 2003).   
 In 2004, the case was taken up by the U.S. Supreme Court, which found that the 
two lower courts had applied a construction of the § 271 (e) (1) exemption that was 
improperly narrow.  The Court held that Merck/Scripps’ research, even though not 
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 directly intended to produce drug data for submission to the FDA, was covered by the 
“safe harbor” exemption because it was foundational research required in the drug 
discovery pipeline, perhaps broadening the Hatch Waxman exemption to cover many 
types of basic biomedical research.  However, the Court was measured in its words and 
was very careful not to construe the ruling too broadly, especially into the area of 
research tools.  In a footnote, the Court explicitly stated that “[w]e…need not—and do 
not—express a view about whether, or to what extent, § 271 (e) (1) exempts from 
infringement the use of “research tools” in the development of information for the 
regulatory process” (Scalia, 2005).  
 In the wake of the Madey and Merck cases, many have argued that the common 
law exemption is, at best, extremely ambiguous, and, at worst, completely useless to 
academic researchers.  Therefore, calls for a codified research use exemption have 
received renewed interest.  However, before examining the various legislative proposals, 
it is necessary to examine the current research climate, in order to determine the 
appropriate scope of any patent reform legislation. 
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 Section 3 
 
The current climate of university research 
 
 
 To avoid unintended consequences and the unnecessary weakening of patent 
rights, the reach of any exemption proposal should extend just far enough to address the 
scope of the underlying problems of patented research tools.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine the current climate of academic research to see if conditions warrant action, and, 
if so, which proposals are best suited to reduce hindrances to innovation.  This 
examination will proceed by first considering whether or not the general concerns over 
patented research tools have become manifest, as many commentators have feared.  
Secondly, we will examine the specifics of research in the post-Madey environment, to 
determine if firms have changed behaviors and if there is an increased risk of suits being 
brought against universities for infringement. 
Are biotech patents hindering research? 
 The aforementioned potential obstacles to academic research resulting from 
intellectual property rights on research inputs (anticommons effect, patent thickets, and 
royalty stacking) have been cited as problematic for more than a decade.  Have these 
patent issues stifled academic or basic research?  There is some evidence that patent 
rights on genomic discoveries does hinder downstream use of the product or process, 
particularly in the area of DNA sequences that are used as research tools.   
One way of tracking the effects of patenting on downstream use is by using the 
number of times an article describing a technology is cited by subsequent research 
articles as a proxy for how broadly the technology is available to the research 
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 community.  The more times an article is cited, theoretically, the more easily it is 
obtainable by scientists.  One quantitative citation analysis by Bhaven Sampat found that 
articles describing patented genomic discoveries received approximately 8 percent fewer 
citations than similar articles, the subject of which were unpatented materials (Sampat, 
2004).  However, this effect was due almost entirely to declines in citations on patented 
DNA sequences used as research tools.  Sequence based patented discoveries experienced 
a 14 percent decline in citations versus unpatented sequences, while for nonsequence 
genomic tools, patenting caused no decline in subsequent citations (Sampat, 2004).  
Another quantitative citation analysis by Murray and Stern discovered that citations on 
biotechnology articles in Nature Biotechnology declined 9 to 17 percent after a patent 
was granted on the discovery in question, leading the authors to conclude that “there is 
robust evidence for a quantitatively modest, but statistically significant anticommons 
effect” (Murray and Stern, 2005).   
 So, if there is some evidence that patents may interfere with downstream 
academic use, is that having an effect on the research community?  Anecdotally, there 
seems to be evidence that patents can affect how research is conducted.  Sue Patow, an 
officer in the University of Minnesota’s technology licensing office claims that IP 
concerns have become so severe that “universities are reticent to share information” for 
fear of violating licensing agreements or undermining lucrative patent rights (Patow, 
2006).  A 2005 survey conducted by Steven Hansen of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) community found that “[i]n the case of university 
based bioscience researchers, 35 percent who acquired patented technologies reported 
difficulties affecting their research” (Hansen, Brewster et al., 2005).  Of those scientists 
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 who reported difficulties, more than half (58%) had their research delayed, while more 
than one quarter (28%) had to abandon the research project entirely (Hansen, Brewster et 
al., 2005).     
 However, surveys and interviews conducted by John Walsh, Wes Cohen, and 
Ashish Arora contend that patents on research tools are having, at most, a very modest 
effect on university research and are not posing a significant threat to innovation.  While 
over a third of respondents acknowledged that concerns over patented research tools 
caused delays and increased the cost of projects, the authors found that “almost 
none…reported commercially or scientifically promising projects being stopped because 
of issues of access to IP rights to research tools” (Walsh, Arora et al., 2003).  Out of 55 
respondents who cited delays due to patent concerns, only one could identify a specific 
project being abandoned because of a failure to obtain patent rights (Walsh, Arora et al., 
2003).  A 2005 follow up study found that “even modifications or delays are rare, each 
affecting around 1% of our sample” (Walsh, Cho et al., 2005).  Furthermore, in cases 
where there are delays, “the vast majority of agreements [over licenses or materials] are 
settled in under one month” (Walsh, Cho et al., 2005).  The authors conclude that the 
anticommons effect “has not been especially problematic” (Walsh, Arora et al., 2003).  
 But what about royalty stacking and increased costs of licenses?  Has this 
prevented academic researchers from pursuing worthwhile projects?  Again, the studies 
of Walsh, Cohen, and Arora suggest not.  The survey and interviews found that although 
licenses and royalty fees (sometimes to multiple owners) had increased the cost of 
research, researchers thought such increases were “within reason largely because of the 
productivity gains conferred by the licensed research tools were thought to be worth the 
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 price” (Walsh, Arora et al., 2003).  Also, the added cost of licensing fees was found to be 
small in most cases.  Twenty-two of twenty-three researchers responding to a question 
about licensing fees responded that there was no fee requested by the patent holder for 
their use of the technology; the other respondent claimed the fee was in the range of $1 to 
$1,000. (Walsh, Cho et al., 2005).  These responses led the authors to conclude that 
“royalty stacking does not represent a significant threat to ongoing R&D projects” 
(Walsh, Arora et al., 2003).   
 As a result of the two studies, the authors have determined that most of the 
concerns over the effects of patented research tools on basic research have not become 
reality.  The authors acknowledge that while “the patent landscape has indeed become 
more complex, with more patents on upstream discoveries…few of the frictions that had 
been anticipated had materialized” (Walsh, Cho et al., 2005).  These findings have been 
echoed by researchers in other countries.  A 2006 report by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) claimed that “these findings [of the 
Walsh/Cohen surveys] are in keeping with the results of an earlier, smaller, German 
study.  The work of Straus suggests that ‘patents on research tools have not had a 
discernible effect on the cost or pace of research in Germany’” (Dent, Jensen et al., 
2006).  An earlier work by the OECD had also concluded that “a large gaps exists 
between the concerns of the public [over complex IP arrangements] and the actual 
problems identified by experts and documented by survey” (OECD, 2002).   
 Still, Walsh/Cohen and others acknowledge that even though concerns about 
research tool patents may be unfounded at this point, there is the potential for them to 
hinder research in the future.  Walsh and Cohen concluded that although they found little 
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 evidence that multiple patents are hindering access, “conditions may indeed be conducive 
to a tragedy of the anticommons” (Walsh, Arora et al., 2003).  The authors also warned 
that “our interviews and prior cases suggest that…ongoing scrutiny is warranted” (Walsh, 
Arora et al., 2003).  Furthermore, “although stopped and stillborn projects are not 
especially evident, many of the working solutions to the IP complexity can impose social 
costs…[T]he use of substitute research tools, inventing around or going offshore—
although all privately rational strategies—constitute a social waste” (Walsh, Arora et al., 
2003).  In 2003, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(PCAST) also warned of the potential for patents to begin hindering downstream 
innovation and recommended further monitoring to ensure “access to these [research] 
tools for further research and exploration” (PCAST, 2003).  Thus, while it appears that 
patents on research tools represent, at worst, a moderate threat academic research, the 
potential does exist that future conditions could exacerbate this situation and seriously 
affect academic research, and even current “working solutions” may not be the socially 
optimal solution to these issues.    
Madey v. Duke and university tech transfer 
 The second question to ask regarding the current research climate concerns the 
fallout from the Madey v. Duke decision in 2002.  The court’s finding, which essentially 
eliminated universities’ ability to escape infringement claims by using the common law 
research use exemption, could alter firm behavior and allow companies to begin asserting 
patents against universities, undermining the traditional “rational forbearance” that has 
defined the academic/industrial relationship for two decades.  Not only could companies 
continue to file suits against other firms, but “patentees may be emboldened by the 
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 decision…to extend their aggressive patent enforcement to noncommercial ‘pure 
research’ as well” (Keyes, 2002).   
 The biggest threat, however, is not just that individual institutions could face legal 
battles and costly damages.  The decision itself, and the lack of a common law exemption 
on which to rely, could have profound effects on technology licensing offices and 
university behavior.  Josh Sarnoff, in an amicus curiae submission to the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued that “[a]s recognition and understanding of the 
Madey decision continues to expand…the willingness of scientists and their institutions 
to ignore patents will continue to deteriorate” (Sarnoff, 2005).  Universities would no 
longer be able to turn a blind eye toward scientists who did not take licenses and would 
be especially unwilling to “countenance unauthorized use, knowing there is a risk of 
treble damages for willful infringement” (Dreyfuss, 2003).  Caught in legal limbo, where 
they are unsure if their activities could be protected under any type of an exemption, 
some fear that universities “will be forced to bear substantial administrative and financial 
costs to cover patent searches, infringement opinions, licensing agreements…” (Keyes, 
2002).  This kind of work regarding intellectual property is standard operating procedure 
in industrial settings, but could pose a major problem for nonprofit, academic institutions, 
because “[w]hile corporations have legal departments geared towards answering potential 
legal quagmires, universities do not have the infrastructure to render routine opinion 
work to researchers” (Barash, 1997). 
In addition to the financial burden which would be placed on universities to more 
strictly monitor patent rights, the time and energy devoted to such an enterprise would 
considerably overtax tech transfer staff.  Joyce Brinton, of Harvard University, claims 
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 that if universities were required to work out licenses for each use of patented materials, 
“it would be a disaster for the research community and the academic world…it would be 
a terrible problem.  We would be spending all of our time negotiating licenses, it would 
be an enormous impediment to research.  It’s not merely negotiating in terms of 
regarding how much are you going to pay…that’s the least of the problem” (Brinton, 
2006).  Sue Patow, from the University of Minnesota, echoing this claim, pointed out that 
while costs may be an issue, another major problem is “the bureaucracy of getting all the 
agreement agreed upon” (Patow, 2006).  For these reasons, the National Research 
Council warned that if firm behavior shifted as a result of the Madey decision, or 
universities became wary of relying on the tenuous common law exemption, “[t]he 
administrative burden on investigators and their institutions and the financial cost of 
efforts to ensure observance of patent rights could be considerable” (NRC, 2004).   
 But have these threats materialized?  We will answer this question by examining 
two different subquestions:  1) Are firms more likely to assert patent rights against 
universities since the Madey decision?; and 2)  Have universities become more vigilant in 
preventing illicit use by their researchers and have those changes in university behavior 
affected research? 
Firm behavior post-Madey v. Duke  
Immediately following the Madey decision, there was some concern that 
universities were getting an increasing number of letters from companies, stating that 
particular researchers were violating patent rights by using materials without a license 
(“notification letters”).  This behavior could have signaled that companies were, indeed, 
emboldened by the decision and felt more justified in demanding universities take 
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 licenses.  The National Research Council (NRC) reported that “[a]n informal poll of 
research institutions…revealed that a number of institutions were receiving more 
notification letters…in the aftermath of the decision” (NRC, 2004).  An increase in 
notifications was reported by the AAAS, which had collected information from 66 
research institutions (NRC, 2006).  A presentation to the National Academies concluded 
that “[t]he percentage of participating institutions receiving notifications has already 
increased” (NAS, 2005).   
 However, in the four years since the Madey decision, the fears that companies 
would no longer tolerate infringement seem to be dying down.  It appears observers 
believe that increases in letters are negligible, certainly not the wave of assertions which 
some had expected following the verdict.  Steve Heinig, of the American Association of 
Medical Colleges (AAMC), claims that there “hasn’t been a big blip as far as we can tell 
as far as activity of institutions receiving letters…I don’t think there’s terribly much 
concern at this time that there are more companies, or that any one company is more apt 
to assert a patent right” (Heinig, 2006).  Joyce Brinton agrees with this assessment:  “You 
know, there might have been a few more after the court case, but not enough to make any 
real difference…The marginal increase in numbers of inquiries is so minor so as to be 
almost not worth thinking about…” (Brinton, 2006).   
The surveys of Walsh, et al. also demonstrated a small increase in the number of 
assertion letters:  “Five percent of our academic respondents have been made aware of 
such notification.  This is not much different from the 3 percent of our respondents who 
report having received such notification five years ago, prior to the Madey v. Duke 
decision.  It is interesting to note that these numbers remain quite small” (Walsh, Cho et 
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 al., 2005).  Even when universities receive letters, the effects on research are typically 
minimal.  The National Academies presentation which noted an increase in letters also 
pointed out that for 77 percent of the cases in which a letter was received, the project was 
not affected at all.  Five percent of the letters resulted in a delay, and five percent 
required changing the project.  Only two percent of the projects were abandoned as a 
result of a notification (NAS, 2005).  This minimal increase in assertions, and their lack 
of effect on research projects has led some to conclude that “[d]espite the dire predictions 
regarding Madey’s implications, it appears that university research thus far has survived 
largely unscathed.  Many university researchers continue to use patented materials 
without permission and are not being sued, or even questioned, by the relevant patent 
holders (Weschler, 2004). 
University tech transfer post-Madey v. Duke 
Despite the apparent lack of an industry-wide response, have universities changed 
their behavior in response to the loss of the common law exemption?  It appears that for 
researchers, many of whom continue to use patented materials without licenses, the 
Madey decision has made little impact on their concerns over IP rights.  Walsh, et al. 
reported in 2005 that the decision had “only a modest effect on the sensitivity of 
academic bench scientists to the use of others’ intellectual property, since only 2% of our 
academic respondents have started looking for patents since that decision” (Walsh, Cho 
et al., 2005).  Joyce Brinton points out a similar lack of urgency from scientists at 
Harvard:  “[C]ertainly there has not been a rush from researchers to come to the 
[technology transfer] office to say, ‘Oh dear, I’m worried about my project because I may 
have need for technology that is patented by somebody else’” (Brinton, 2006).   
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 However, while scientists appear to be no more concerned with patents than 
before Madey, the institutions themselves do seem to be more observant.  The 2005 
Walsh study found that “institution level concern [over infringement] appears to be 
growing” (Walsh, Cho et al., 2005).  The 2005 survey revealed that 22 percent of 
researchers had been contacted by their institution to watch out for patents in their 
research, a 7 percent increase from the number who reported such notification before the 
Madey decision (Walsh, Cho et al., 2005).  Sue Patow points out that the University of 
Minnesota has stepped up efforts to warn researchers of respecting IP rights:  “[W]e’re 
making sure our scientists understand who owns the IP, where it lies, as well as whose IP 
they’re going to be using to do their research…They were very cavalier in the past about, 
‘Well, I’m just going to use this because I’m just doing internal research’, and we’re 
saying, ‘That doesn’t hold anymore’” (Patow, 2006).   
Patow also points out that companies have somewhat altered their behavior in 
terms of licensing agreements.  The companies, she claims, have sensed an opportunity to 
force universities to take licenses, and that “the agreements that come from these 
companies are incredibly onerous…I see a lot more of it since Madey v. Duke” (Patow, 
2006).  These terms can be so burdensome that they force universities to alter their 
willingness to agree to licenses, which may be impeding research:  “I have to be honest, 
there are some [licensing agreements] that we’re walking away from, and we’re basically 
saying to our researchers, ‘We’re not going to sign this agreement, it’s not fair, you’re 
going to have to find another source’” (Patow, 2006).  However, Jon Sandelin, at 
Stanford, insists that he hasn’t witnessed any great shifts in the academic industrial 
relations since Madey:  “I haven’t personally seen any significant changes in our 
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 relationships, and our dealings, how we approach dealings, how we basically handle 
ourselves because of these issues” (Sandelin, 2006).  He claims that this stability is due to 
the fact that “companies and universities aren’t competitors, they’re motivated in the 
same direction, and that is to take some technology created in the university and move it 
forward into commercial markets, and that creates profits for the company and royalties 
for the universities and everybody wins” (Sandelin, 2006).  Thus, it appears that while the 
number of assertions may be little changed, there may already be some shifts in firm 
behavior, with a correspondent change in university attitudes toward patent rights. 
Future potential consequences of Madey 
However, while the worst fears of full-fledged litigation increases have to this 
point been avoided, there is still the danger that aggressive behavior by firms could alter 
the delicate situation facing nonprofit research institutions.  Joyce Brinton emphasizes 
that the success of the current steady state “depends upon whether there’s a real increase 
in that enforcement mentality [by companies] and that’s possible” (Brinton, 2006).  Such 
a change could occur quickly.  One respondent to a study by the Australian Council of 
Intellectual Property (ACIP) pointed out that “it would only take a small number of 
significant infringement suits against researchers…to see a significant degree of 
‘shyness’ develop in the research community” (Dent, Jensen et al., 2006).  The National 
Research Council claimed that just “a few cases of successful patent assertions could 
have a powerful demonstration effect [on universities]” (NRC, 2006).   
This potential danger and the precarious standing of the current situation seem to 
be the primary driving force behind exemption proposals.  Since there have been no 
major suits brought against universities in the wake of Madey, all concerned parties are 
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 unsure how the newly defined exemption will be applied.  Instead of settling the research 
exemption question, the Court’s ruling “may heighten any problems raised by uncertainty 
over the reach of the experimental use defense” (FTC, 2003).  Josh Sarnoff also 
advocates for a clarification of the exemption through statute, despite the relatively small 
effects on the research community thus far:  “[Y]ou see a low level of science 
experiments that are delayed or rejected, but an increasing number and the question is:  
‘should you be concerned about that?’  And I think you should be very concerned 
because any system which depends on, for its ability to continue to do the science on 
ignoring the law as its currently stated in Duke is a bad system” (Sarnoff, 2006). 
Steve Heinig, who has been an active member in discussions about the AAMC’s 
position on the research use exemption, claims that while “there’s a lot of conformity that 
[the chances of companies suing universities] is not a very great danger at this time…I 
think that there’s also an agreement generally that this could be a worry, and then the 
difference in opinion is active to become to head off or to remediate a situation that 
hasn’t arisen yet” (Heinig, 2006).  Steve Merrill, who staffed the NRC committee that 
recommended a form of research exemption, shares the sentiment with Heinig, 
explaining that while the committee thought lawsuits against university were still 
unlikely, “they thought it was possible, and to the extent that there were public policy 
measures that could intervene and prevent it and didn’t have other downside effects, then 
they ought to be considered and maybe adopted” (Merrill, 2006).    
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 Section 4 
Crafting a codified research use exemption 
 
The need for legislative action 
Certainly, the unclear status of the current common law exemption is a source of 
uneasiness and confusion among researchers and their institutions, both academic and 
industrial.  While the informal approach and “working solutions” adopted by universities 
and businesses have performed well to this point, the “social costs associated with this de 
facto exemption can be quite substantial” (Weschler, 2004).  Therefore, many have 
championed the idea that a statutory research exemption in U.S. patent law “undoubtedly 
would protect experimental research more efficiently and with more certainty than this 
non-legal working arrangement” (Weschler, 2004).  Additionally, a properly written 
codified exemption could help clear up the ambiguities which have arisen from judicial 
opinions on the matter. 
 Some critics have advised that federal courts (even the Supreme Court) are not the 
appropriate arenas in which to settle the issue of the proper scope of the research use 
exemption.  They contend that since a strong patent code is so important to our nation’s 
innovative capacity, legislators are in better position than justices to decide the 
appropriate form of any exemption.  Some believe the task is simply too great for the 
courts to undertake, that judges “should not engage in the kind of nuanced policy 
balancing necessary to craft a meaningful experimental use defense” (Mueller, 2004).  
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 In an amicus brief to the Federal Circuit in the Madey v. Duke case, Solicitor 
General of the United States Theodore Olson insisted that “any substantial altering of the 
balance between the goals of the patent laws and the demands of academic research calls 
for judgments that are legislative, not judicial, in nature” (Olson, 2002).  Olson also went 
on to point out the potential absurdity of relying on Justice Story’s original precedent, 
given the changes in research practices over the past two centuries:  “Indeed, it seems 
improbable that a 190 year old judge-made defense with little rooting in any statutory text 
could anticipate the challenges of the modern academic and research environment and 
adequately accommodate the competing policy concerns raised by the parties in this 
case” (Olson, 2002).  Not only have courts be unable to adequately define the exemption 
but most federal courts have been reluctant to even confront the issue.  Most court 
decisions (with the exception of the Madey and Merck cases) have employed sufficient 
judicial restraint so as to avoid directly defining the research use exemption.  In light of 
this refusal to even take up the issue, it appears that congressional action may be the only 
way to solidify the exact nature of the experimental use exemption (Mueller, 2004). 
Defining the statutory exemption:  the options 
 Should Congress find compelling reason to attempt to codify such an exemption, 
what would be the factors which it would have to take into consideration?  Obviously, 
given the concerns of the academic community, the exemption should protect researchers 
and universities engaged in basic research activities for the purpose of promoting 
innovation.  However, another challenge would also be to maintain the benefits of the 
monopolies granted by patent system which, themselves, are the cornerstone of U.S. 
innovative policy.  As the OECD points out, “a first rate patent policy provides investors 
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 with an incentive to invest, while not limiting any knowledge spillovers that will have 
only a small effect on this incentive to invest” (Dent, Jensen et al., 2006).  Balancing 
these simultaneous factors would not be an easy challenge.  Therefore, the first step in 
designing a codified exemption would be determining the scope of the exemption, how 
broad should such an exception be? 
 The consequence of drafting an exemption that is too broad could be disastrous 
for U.S. innovation and, indeed, antithetical to the goals of the patent system.  Firstly, an 
overly broad exemption could “dissuade inventors from using the patent law to protect 
their ideas, thus reducing the level of public disclosure of new inventions” (Karp, 1991).  
The cornerstone of the patent bargain is that in exchange for a temporary monopoly over 
the use of their invention, patent owners must fully disclose their invention to the world, 
which prevents hording of ideas and encourages further innovation.  Knowledge of a 
broad exemption “would encourage inventors to resort to state trade secret protection or 
perhaps no legal protections at all” (Karp, 1991).  Such a result would undermine the 
entire U.S. patent system and could, ironically, stifle innovation much more severely than 
would happen in the absence of any exemption.   
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, an overly broad exemption would rob 
patent holders of licensing and royalty income and prevent them from recouping R&D 
money which they had invested in creating their invention.  Especially in the world of 
research tools, where basic research constitutes a large percentage of the market share, a 
broad exemption would have the effect of “effectively eviscerating the value of patents 
on research tools” (Eisenberg, 1997).  This loss of profitability would make it harder for 
smaller companies, whose business model is selling research tools, to attract investment 
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 capital, which would reduce their ability to produce further products (Freeburg, 2005).  
Paradoxically, since universities and other smaller entities are more likely to have their 
patents stolen or imitated by larger firms, they could actually suffer more from a broad 
exemption:  “A broad exception would be especially harmful to small firms, research 
centers, and universities that invent important advances, but do not have the resources to 
develop the advance into a commercial product” (Michel, 1992).  Overall, the loss of 
profitability could “eliminate incentives for private firms to develop and disseminate new 
research tools, which could, on balance, do more harm than good to the research 
enterprise” (Eisenberg, 1997).  The gains in output from universities and other research 
institutions would potentially have to be very great to make up for the decreases in 
innovation from biotech companies who would lose their incentive to invent.   
Thus, it appears that any codified exemption should not represent a legislative 
free-for-all, as a broad exemption could be worse than no action at all.  The question then 
becomes:  how to craft a narrow exemption that will sufficiently protect and promote 
basic, university research, while ensuring an appropriate level of incentive for inventors 
to innovate and rely on the patent system.  Steve Heinig points out that the trouble is “that 
we don’t know exactly how to write a statutory exemption, it’s very problematic to 
actually sit down and write out what we think would be exempted and what wouldn’t be” 
(Heinig, 2006).  Clearly, the devil is in the details.  This paper will focus on creating an 
exemption based on two different distinctions:  1) commercial vs. noncommercial intent, 
and 2) research on an invention vs. research with an invention. 
Commercial vs. noncommercial 
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  Many observers have considered that the primary consideration in deciding which 
types of behavior would be exempted focus on the entity performing the research and 
whether or not there is commercial intent in the infringing behavior.  Over the past 
century, the judicially-crafted common law exemption has rarely been applied to 
situations where the infringement was performed in conjunction with a business or 
commercial application.11  The main theory was that “allowing an experimental use 
exception in a commercial setting allows subsequent inventors to free ride on the original 
inventor’s work…This free riding can make it impossible for the original inventor to 
appropriate returns on early R&D investment” (Michel, 1992).  Thus, some contend that 
any statutory research exemption should focus solely on noncommercial entities, whose 
work is conducted in the “public interest, broadly defined” (Sewell, 2005).  Exempting 
their behavior is particularly important because, unlike industrial, commercial firms, 
academic institutions “do not always have the resources—or even the expectation of 
resources—to pay licensing fees for the technologies they need” (Dreyfuss, 2003). 
Supporters of limiting an exemption to nonprofit institutions also point out that 
exempting their infringing behavior will also have little impact on the commercial entities 
which control the patents, because the university research is less likely than a for profit 
firm to use the patent to develop a product which would compete with the original 
invention (Strandburg, 2004).  Of course, there is considerable difficulty in determining 
what constitutes nonprofit, basic, or academic work.  Some have advocated a minimum 
threshold of federal funding (such as 50 percent) in order to qualify (Michel, 1992).  
                                                 
11 The exception to this general rule of noncommercial status to invoke an exemption is, of course, the 
Hatch-Waxman exemption, which was intended to apply specifically to commercial entities.  The key 
distinction is that the Hatch-Waxman exemption was meant to apply to a different context, the creation of 
generic drugs.   
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 Others insist that any work done in a “noncommercial” setting should be exempted, if a 
substitute for the tool or reagent is not available (Hoffman, 2004).   
 The commercial/nonprofit dichotomy is particularly confusing in the 
biotechnology sector, given the intricacies of the academic/industrial interaction and the 
degree to which many universities have gone from “research collaborators to commercial 
competitors” in the biotech industry (Mowery, Nelson et al., 2004).  Given that 
universities are major players in the acquisition of genomic patents and often reap huge 
profits from licensing fees, “a division of exempted and nonexempted research activities 
based on commercial implications would not make sense in today’s research environment 
either” (Cai, 2004).  Arti Rai contends that “[t]he key problem with any research 
exemption is that, given the commingling or research and commercial activity even in 
nonprofit institutions such as universities, delineating the activities to which the 
exemption should apply is likely to prove very difficult” (Rai, 2002).   
 Aside from being a difficult line to draw, the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction also may not be a fair one to make.  After all, universities are engaged in drug 
discovery and other lucrative areas and do control valuable patent portfolios.  Therefore, 
“[i]t might seem ironic, considering the number of patents secured by universities…and 
the revenue that such universities secure from the exploitation of such patents that 
implicit in such surprise and concern is an assumption that ‘basic research’ undertaken by 
universities should be treated differently from the same sort of research when undertaken 
in industry” (Cook, 2004).  Some supporters contend that, “while it is certainly true that 
universities can be treated like commercial actors, doing so ignores crucial differences 
and could, ultimately, kill the traditional role that universities play in teaching, training, 
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 and creating the spillover benefits that are ultimately reaped by the private enterprise” 
(Dreyfuss, 2004).  However, U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olson also notes the irony 
of the argument, claiming that “[t]here is nothing in the current patent laws to suggest 
that modern universities—many of which have themselves taken advantage of patent 
protection and entered into licensing arrangements—are somehow outside the class of 
potential infringers because of an asserted noncommercial status” (Olson, 2002).  There 
is also the fear that if the exemption applied only to nonprofit research, a corporation 
could simply move its research operation onto university soil and reap the benefits of the 
exemption (Michel, 1992).   
Paradoxically, an exemption targeted at noncommercial entities could also hurt 
universities, especially those who control lucrative patents, the majority of which are 
research tools that are licensed to other universities.  Harvard’s Joyce Brinton recognizes 
the danger of singling out universities for an exemption:  “God forbid that anybody 
would propose this kind of legislation that is that research with [patented materials] is 
fine for nonprofits, but is not fine for anybody else.  I don’t think that the university 
community needs that kind of situation where they’re being treated so differently, 
especially if at the same time they’re licensing their patents for revenue” (Brinton, 2006).   
Thus, since the commercial/noncommercial distinction appears to be problematic, 
perhaps it is appropriate to extend the exemption to activities conducted in a commercial 
setting, and possibly even those with a commercial intent.  Given today’s research 
climate and the extent to which universities are engaged in commercial enterprise, 
“[p]rofit motive should no longer be held antithetical to the experimental use doctrine,” 
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 and any codified exemption should “consider the commercial realities of the twenty first 
century research and development process” (Mueller, 2001).  
However, Josh Sarnoff points out that this is not necessarily a new idea.  Even in 
the historical construction of the common law exemption, the fact that research was 
conducted by a business did not preclude the use from being exempted:  “this type of 
activity [research which fell under the common law exemption] develops innovation and 
it shouldn’t be restricted by patent law, period…if it was legitimate research, even though 
legitimate research helps a business, that was just fine” (Sarnoff, 2006).  Clearly, social 
benefits from experimental use of patented inventions and profit are not mutually 
exclusive and the present of commercial potential does not taint the user from enjoying 
the protection of the exemption.  Ducor echoes this sentiment, asserting that although the 
post-Madey research exemption “systematically exclude[s] from exemption all 
experimentation occurring in commercial settings...valuable follow-on research can and 
does occur in such contexts, and there is no policy justification for not exempting them” 
(Ducor, 1999).  Rai concludes that “if we are going to have a research exemption to 
reduce deadweight loss, that exemption should apply to all research” (Rai, 2002).   
Therefore, it appears that attempting to define an exemption based on commercial 
status is an extremely problematic way of crafting the scope of a statutory exemption.  In 
today’s confusing research climate, where the lines between traditional “basic” and 
“applied” research have become hopelessly blurred, and any attempt to establish any 
meaningful definitions for “nonprofit” and “commercial” research would be a futile 
effort.  The OECD warned which warned that “[u]nclear definitions of exemptions could 
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 have a chilling effect on the progress of basic science” (OECD, 2002).  This is hardly the 
policy goal we are after.   
Research with vs. research on 
 Since using the commercial/noncommercial axis as the basis for a codified 
exemption may be difficult, perhaps even impossible, in today’s research climate, many 
observers have concluded that the better alternative would be to base an exemption on the 
nature of the use, regardless of the profit motive of the user.  The use of this criterion, 
assumes two basic ways in which patented inventions can be used in research.  The first 
type of use (which we shall call experimentation with the invention) involves using the 
invention in the course of research in its prescribed way in order to achieve some goal or 
complete a project.  For example, research with a microscope would involve using the 
microscope to examine cancer cells to explore how they grow in response to a certain 
anticancer drug.  Most research using “research tools” falls into this category.  The 
second type of use (which we shall call experimentation on the invention) involves 
research which is designed to study the invention itself.  For instance, research on the 
microscope might involve taking it apart to examine how the lenses were arranged, or 
adjusting the mirrors to try to increase its resolution.  
One champion of this strategy was Judge Pauline Newman in the Merck v. Integra 
case, where she advocated using these criteria in determining whether certain behaviors 
should fall under the experimental use doctrine. Judge Newman claimed that the 
“prohibition of all research into patented subject matter is as impractical as it is 
incorrect”, noting the “fundamental distinction between research into the science and 
technology disclosed in patents, and the use in research of patented products or methods, 
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 the so-called ‘research tools’” (Newman, 2003).  Accordingly, the Newman approach 
ignores profit motive as a criterion:  “…an ultimate goal or hope of profit from successful 
research should not eliminate the exemption.  The better rule is to recognize the 
exemption for research conducted to understand or improve upon or modify the patented 
subject matter, whatever the ultimate goal” (Newman, 2003).   
Many other commentators have been persuaded to use this as the main criterion 
for establishing a research use exemption.  “The experimenting on versus experimenting 
with dichotomy offered by dissenting Judge Newman in Integra has been widely accepted 
by commentators as an important, if not entirely determinative, factor in assessing 
experimental use” (Mueller, 2004).  The idea of comparing research with to research on 
has also been cited as a key way to apply the experimental use exemption to research 
tools.  Ducor claims that “applying the experimental use exemption to research tool 
patents is neither impossible nor unfair, provided one keeps in mind the policy goals 
underlying the patent system and makes the right distinction between research on an 
invention and research with an invention” (Ducor, 1999).  In order to balance these needs, 
we must to return to our overall policy goal, summarized beautifully by Katherine 
Strandburg:  “The purpose of an experimental use exemption should be to protect the 
patentee’s ability to recoup her research and development investment while preventing 
her from using her exclusive rights to exercise unwarranted control over subsequent 
innovation” (Strandburg, 2004).   
Supporters of a research with form of exemption claim that it addresses the most 
pressing issues surrounding patented research tools.  Indeed, most research tool patents 
cover products that are generally used in a manner which would fall under the research 
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 with criterion.  For instance, patented gene products, sequences, techniques, and 
machines are all primarily used in the course of genomic research to develop other 
products, such as therapeutics or diagnostics.  Rarely are the inventions themselves the 
subject of the research.  Therefore, if the goal is to ensure adequate access to these 
inventions and preventing university researchers from having to pay burdensome 
licensing fees, then a codified exemption would ideally cover this type of research.   
However, there are substantial downsides to exempting this kind of use of 
patented inventions.  First, there is contention over whether allowing this kind of 
exemption would even be fair, considering that researchers would simply be using a 
product for its intended use and that exempting such use could undermine companies 
whose entire business models rely on their ability to sell these tools.  Strandburg makes 
this point, drawing an analogy to other products these researchers use:  “[t]here are many 
patented research tools…that are widely available on the market from parties whose 
business consists in selling such items.  There is no immediately obvious reason that 
nonprofit research laboratories should avoid paying…for such inventions, just as they do 
for patented copy machines, computers, and staplers” (Strandburg, 2004).  An Australian 
biotech company made a similar analogy, pointing out that “[r]esearch organizations do 
not get their computers free, they do not get software from Microsoft free, nor do they get 
their chemical lab supplies, staff, space, equipment and utilities free of charge.  Why 
should they be empowered to utilize intellectual property free of charge without 
consideration or benefit for the inventor?” (ALRC, 2004).   
Proponents of a research with exemption claim that the increased research and 
innovation which is enabled through money saved on licenses and expanded access to 
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 patented tools more than makes up for the lost profits of a few research tools 
manufacturers.  However, these arguments fail to take into account that any research with 
exemption would not only hurt research tool revenues in the short run, but would create 
disincentives for those same companies to develop new and better research tools.  
Universities fund most of their research through grants, and so loss of research tool 
revenues would be less catastrophic, but companies that sell research tools generally 
cannot fund their R&D without patent royalties.  Without the promise of recouping their 
R&D investments, research tools manufacturers (many of whom are universities 
themselves), may be unwilling to even attempt to develop new research tools.   
Considering that the new era of genomic research has been made possible in large 
part thanks to the introduction of research tools, the consequences of such an exemption 
could be devastating in the long run.  All of these leads Ducor to conclude that 
“experimenting with a patented invention amounts to using it according to the purpose for 
which it was first designed, and for which the patentee was granted a monopoly…that 
such activities might lead to innovation in fields other than that of the patented invention, 
patentable or not, does not change the analysis” (Ducor, 1999).   
On the other hand, allowing an exemption for experimentation on an invention 
may be in line with the basic aims of patent law:  to encourage inventors to share their 
knowledge with others and foster increased innovation.  In fact, many commentators 
believe that research on an invention (in order to test its properties or to verify the patent 
claims) is simply an extension of the disclosure required of the inventor (Dreyfuss, Rai et 
al., 2005).  Since a patent application requires the inventor to fully disclose how the 
invention works (in verbal description and schematics), some claim that it would be 
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 illogical to forbid other inventors from making or using the invention to examine if it 
works as advertised.  This type of research is also very close to Justice Story’s original 
formulation of the experimental use exemption, permitting researchers to “ascertain the 
verity and exactness of the [patent’s] specification”.12  Proponents of exempting research 
on a patented invention claim that allowing other inventors to build and test the invention 
serves as a check on the patent system, helping to ensure inventions live up to their 
claims and weed out patents that have been granted erroneously.   
However, the greatest argument in favor of exempting research on an invention 
comes from the fact that new inventions are rarely truly novel ideas; most represent 
additions to or improvements on previous inventions.  To prevent scientists from 
tinkering with patented inventions would hinder their ability to make new discoveries.  
While granting patent protection to an idea is essential in promoting innovation for the 
initial inventions in a certain field, “[i]n order to further promote innovation, the patent 
system has to limit the monopoly of patent owners so as not to hinder subsequent 
research and improvements on existing technology.  Innovation stems from the free 
availability of existing technologies, including patented ones” (Ducor, 1999).   
Downstream innovation based on experimentation on a patented invention could take 
many forms, including the discovery of a previously unknown use for the invention or of 
an improvement to the invention (Mueller, 2004).   
But there is conflict over exactly what types of research on activities should be 
exempted.  Uses aimed at discovering properties of the invention, or to test its claims, or 
even attempting to find a novel use for the product are consistent with the original 
common law exemption and promote the goals of the patent system.  Furthermore, they 
                                                 
12 Sawin v. Guild, at 555 
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 do not pose a commercial threat to the inventor, since “invention is used for a different 
purpose from that for which it was originally designed.  Such use represents only a 
minimal loss of revenue for the patentee, as his or her main market resides in other, non-
experimental uses” (Ducor, 1999).   
However, the question of experimentation to improve upon the invention or 
“design-around” attempts (the making of substitutes for an invention) are more 
contentious.  Should it be permissible to allow researchers unfettered access to an 
invention, only to piggy-back on the original inventor’s hard work and design a product 
which will replace it?  Some say that is the essence of the patent system; since the end 
goal is to build a better mouse trap, it doesn’t matter whose profitability is undermined, 
so long as innovation advances.  If the second inventor’s product is superior to that of the 
first, then he/she should receive the monetary award that comes from building a more 
useful product.  Strandburg supports this notion, claiming that “the patent system 
anticipates that competitors will use the patent disclosure to make improvements or 
design-arounds…” (Strandburg, 2004).  Furthermore, because this promotes the inherent 
goals of the patent system, “there is no reason to confine this type of experimental use to 
noncommercial applications” (Strandburg, 2004).   
However, there is not a consensus that these types of possibly commercial 
behavior should be exempted.    Opponents claim that while some of the more benign 
research on uses may be permissible, “it is unjustified and inconsistent with patent law to 
assume that these uses include experimental activity…in a commercial attempt to 
develop either a noninfringing alternative (design around) or an improvement upon an 
existing patent (Karp, 1991).   Since we have already determined that the 
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 commercial/noncommercial dichotomy is too difficult of a line to draw, any exemption 
which permitted research on a patented invention would have to address the question of 
which behaviors would be allowed, especially with regard to improvements or the 
creation of design-arounds.   
Past U.S. exemptions and proposals 
 
Previous attempts at codifying a research use exemption have often been met with 
resistance, and no such generic exemptions have been adopted.  However, these prior 
proposals can inform the current debate and offer a potential template for the form and 
scope of a legislation option. 
H.R. 5598, The Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990 
Title IV of H.R. 5598 contained an exemption which, according to the Judiciary 
Committee report, would create “an incentive for research and experimentation activities 
that is the life blood of U.S. competitiveness in the world marketplace” (Kastenmeier, 
1990).  Section 402 of the bill sought to add the following exemption to 35 U.S.C. § 271:   
 It shall not be an act of infringement to make or use a patented 
invention solely for research or experimentation purposes unless 
the patented invention has a primary purpose of research or 
experimentation. If the patented invention has a primary purpose of 
research or experimentation, it shall not be an act of infringement 
to manufacture or use such invention to study, evaluate, or 
characterize such invention or to create a product outside the scope 
of the patent covering such invention. 
 
The bill was in the spirit of a research on exemption; infringing activity would not be 
permitted if the “patented invention has a primary purpose of research or 
experimentation” (Kastenmeier, 1990).  The committee report on H.R. 5598 listed six 
activities that would be exempted under the statute:   
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 1. testing an invention to determine its sufficiency or to compare it to 
prior art; 
2. tests to determine how the patented invention works; 
3. experimentation on a patented invention for the purpose of improving 
on it or developing a further patentable invention; 
4. experimentation for the purpose of “designing around” a patented 
invention; 
5. testing to determine whether the invention meets the tester’s purposes 
in anticipation of requesting a license; and 
6. academic instructional experimentation with the invention.  
(Kastenmeier, 1990) 
 
The impetus for the research exemption originally came from a patent reform 
proposal in the previous Congress regarding transgenic animal patents, which contained a 
research use exemption.  During the hearings on that legislation, the committee found 
support (including at least one representative from the Association of University 
Technology Managers) for the idea that a research exemption should extend to all 
patents, and not confined to the realm of transgenic animals (Kastenmeier, 1990).  
Another argument advanced by Rep. Robert Kastenmeier in support of the bill was that 
the statute would clear up ambiguity about the scope of the common law research 
exemption:  “Confusion in the general patent law is contrary to sound public policy.  
Unnecessary litigation occurs, excessive threats are leveled, transaction costs are raised, 
and experimentation and research are chilled” (Kastenmeier, 1990).   
However, not all parties agreed on the need for a codified exemption.  Some 
observers pointed out that the current status of the common law exemption was sufficient 
and that the bill “fixes a problem that does not exist” (Barash, 1997).  Rep. Carlos 
Moorhead, in an addendum to the committee report, pointed out the robustness of the 
common law exemption:  “This long standing legal principle [the common law 
exemption] is sound and is a recognized feature of the patent system.  I am not aware of 
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 any reason to believe that there is a need for Congress to codify this doctrine.”  He went 
on to question the belief that the codified exemption was needed to protect university 
research:  “I fail to understand what universities are being protected from.  There has 
never been a case, to my knowledge, where a university has been sued for patent 
infringement for carrying on research on a patented invention” (Kastenmeier, 1990).13  
Others felt that the exemption, as defined in the bill, overstepped judicial construction of 
the research use doctrine and constituted a broadening of the common law experimental 
use exemption, instead of a mere codification (Michel, 1992).  Despite the objections of 
some members of the Judiciary Committee, the research exemption survived the 
committee markup and was included in the final version of H.R. 5598, which passed out 
of the committee on October 26, 1990 with bipartisan support.  However, the bill never 
came before the full House for consideration.   
H.R. 3967, the Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 
A similar research exemption appeared during the 107th Congress as part of H.R. 
3967:  
USE OF GENETIC SEQUENCE INFORMATION- It shall not be 
an act of infringement for any individual or entity to use any patent 
for or patented use of genetic sequence information for purposes of 
research. This paragraph shall not apply to any individual or entity 
that is directly engaged in the commercial manufacture, 
commercial sale, or commercial offer for sale of a drug, medical 
device, process, or other product using such patent for or patented 
use of genetic sequence information.14
 
Here, Congress recognized the use of genomic sequences as a type research tool and 
sought to ensure their availability to the research community.  In presenting the bill to the 
                                                 
13 This objection, of course, was raised before the Madey v. Duke decision, and, therefore, is less relevant to  
the current debate.  
14 H.R. 3967.  Section 2. 
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 House, Representative Lynn Rivers of Michigan stated that the amendment would 
“protect from patent infringement scientists doing basic, fundamental, non-commercial 
research.”15  However, after being presented to the House in March of 2002, the bill was 
referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, and no 
further action was taken.16   
Research exemption as fair use? 
Another possible template for a codified exemption can be found in a different 
area of intellectual property:  copyrights.  Some observers have pointed out that the best 
way to frame a research exemption would be to adhere to the “fair use” doctrine, a well 
defined feature of copyright law that “provides that certain unlicensed but socially 
beneficial uses of copyrighted works such as reproduction for purposes of scholarly 
research, teaching, criticism, and reporting are not infringement” (Mueller, 2004).  In 
deciding whether activities fall under the fair use exemption, courts apply a four way test, 
which takes into account: 1) the nature of the use (including commercial intent), 2) the 
properties of the protected work itself, 3) the amount of the work which was reproduced, 
and 4) the financial impact of the use on the rights holder (Grossman, 1990).   
In the 1985 case of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the 
court upheld the notion that fair use of copyrighted materials was consistent with the aims 
of patent law and that preventing some use of these works would stifle further artistic 
progress:  “The author’s consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works ha[d] 
always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the constitutional policy of 
                                                 
15 Congressional Record, March 14, 2002.  “Introduction of the ‘Genomic Research and Diagnostic 
Accessibility Act of 2002’ H.R. 3967 and the ‘Genomic Science Technology and Innovation Act of 2002’ 
H.R. 3966” p. E-353. 
16 H.R. 3967. Bill Summary and Status.  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03967:@@@X  
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 promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, since a prohibition of such use 
would inhibit subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works and 
thus…frustrate the very ends sought to be obtained” (Grossman, 1990). 
Therefore, because of the successful application in the field of copyrights, some 
feel that a fair use approach to a research exemption would create the desired effect 
without the worry of unintended consequences.  But what would such an exemption look 
like?  There are currently two examples of research exemptions based on copyright law.  
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 amended title 17 U.S.C. § 906 (a) (1) 
and covers copyrights on the particular arrangement of elements on a computer chip 
called the “mask work”17.  The amendment claims that is “not an infringement of the 
exclusive rights of the owner of a mask work for…a person to reproduce the mask work 
solely for the purpose of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques 
embodied in the mask work”.  In a similar exemption, the Vessel Hull Design Protection 
Act, researchers and boat-builders are permitted to construct copyrighted hull designs 
“solely for the purpose of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the appearance, concepts, or 
techniques embodied in the design…”18   
International Precedents 
 While current and proposed amendments offer insight into the possible structuring 
of a research exemption, statutes enacted by other nations can also serve as models.  
Member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are bound by the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to grant robust patent 
                                                 
17 “Mask work” refers to  “a two or three-dimensional layout of an integrated circuit (IC), i.e. the 
arrangement on a chip of semiconductor devices such as transistors and passive electronic components such 
as resistors and interconnections.”  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mask_work.   
18 17 U.S.C.  § 1309 (g) 
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 protection.  However, Article 26 of the document allows member countries to “provide 
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties” (WTO, 1994).  While the wording of the phrase is 
left extremely vague, when the phrase has been the subject of disputes, some countries 
have claimed that the statute implies acceptable “experimental” uses include design 
around attempts, improvements, and academic instruction (ACIP, 2005).   
 Most international statutory exemptions take a form similar to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, allowing for experimental uses for the acquisition of clinical data in making generic 
drugs.  One example is Canada’s “Patent Amendment Act, 1992”, which allows use of 
patented inventions “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information required under any law of Canada…”19  However, some 
countries do, in fact, have more broadly defined exemptions, which cover a range of 
activities.  The most broadly articulated exemptions in this category come from Europe, 
where most statutory regulations have followed the research on model.  Article 31 of the 
European Community Patent Convention of 1975 provided a research exemption for 
“acts done privately and for noncommercial purposes” and “acts done for experimental 
purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention” (Cook, 2004).  Although the 
Community Patent Convention was never officially adopted, most European Union 
countries have incorporated nearly identical language into their patent laws, applying the 
same two part test in defining the scope of the exemption.  For example, the United 
Kingdom’s “Patent Act 1977” contains an exemption which shields users from 
                                                 
19 R.S.C. 1985, c. 2, s. 4. (Supp. 1992) 
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 infringement claims if the activity:  1) is “done privately and for purposes which are not 
commercial”20; and 2) is “done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-mater of 
the invention.”21  Figure 4.1 shows several examples of current statutory exemptions in 
the U.S., United Kingdom, and Canada.   
Figure 4.1:  Examples of current research use exemptions 
 
 
Other nations outside of Europe have also adopted statutory research use 
exemptions.   Israeli law exempts acts that are “not on a commercial scale and [are] not 
commercial in nature” and also those whose objective is to “improve the invention or to 
develop another invention” (Derzko, 2003).  On the other hand, Japanese law lacks the 
requirements on commercial intent as articulated in the European exemptions, claiming 
simply that “the effects of this patent right shall not extend to the working of the patent 
right for the purposes of experiments and research” (Cook, 2004).   
The unique case of Australia  
 In examining international attitudes toward experimental use exemptions, perhaps 
no other country’s experience is as valuable to the United States as Australia’s.  This is 
                                                 
20 Patents Act 1977.  1977 Chapter 37 § 60 (5) (a) 
21 Patents Act 1977.  1977 Chapter 37 § 60 (5) (b) 
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 because, like the U.S., Australia also has no codified research exemption its patent law.  
However, the Australian government is in the process of seriously considering options, 
and two separate reports have been filed on the subject, one by the Australian Advisory 
Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP), the other by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC).   
 Both ultimately suggested the adoption of a form of a limited codified research 
use exemption, while cautioning that exempting too broad of a range of activities could 
undermine the effectiveness of the patent system.  Citing the current narrowing of the 
common law exemption in the United States, the ACIP concluded that “the current US 
approach is best avoided, as this reduces allowable experimental activity to a narrow set 
of circumstances that does not appear to be in accord with the fundamental principles of 
the patent system” (ACIP, 2005).  The ALRC laid out a set of justifications for the 
recommended that a codified exemption should only be adopted if the statute, among 
other things, “…promotes attainment of new knowledge about patented inventions; 
promoted the development of new and improved technologies…removes a burden on 
researchers…and involves minimal interference with the patent holder’s economic 
interests” (ALRC, 2004).   
Specifically, the ALRC recommended a research on exemption, suggesting that 
the country amend the law to exempt “the use of a patented invention to study or 
experiment on the subject matter of the invention; for example to investigate its 
properties or improve upon it” (ALRC, 2004).  Because the nature of “commercial” use 
has become such a murky issue, the commission also stressed that “[t]he legislation 
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 should make it clear that the existence of a commercial purpose or intention does not 
affect the availability of the defence [sic]” (ALRC, 2004).   
 The ACIP echoed the majority of these sentiments, including the claim that the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction has become too difficult to form the basis for a 
research exemption (ACIP, 2005).  Accordingly, the council recommended an exemption 
for “acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention 
that do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent” (ACIP, 
2005).  Acts which fall under the exemption include “determining how the invention 
works; determining the scope of the invention; determining the validity of the claims; 
seeking an improvement to the invention” (ACIP, 2005).  The commission recognized 
that their exemption would inevitably create some ambiguities that could only be 
completely removed through case law (ACIP, 2005).  However, the report also outlined 
several benefits of the proposal, including the notion that “the limits to patent rights are 
clarified, thus reducing uncertainty and resulting inefficiencies and underperformance in 
the research industry” (ACIP, 2005).  However, the council also pointed out the 
advantage of adopting a law similar to the EU exemptions, pointing out that the proposed 
amendment would bring Australia “substantially in harmony with European provisions” 
(ACIP, 2005).    
 This argument about harmonization is also particularly relevant to the American 
situation.  Through international agreements like TRIPS, there has been a strong 
movement toward unifying intellectual property laws across different countries, reducing 
barriers to technology transfer and removing unnecessary transaction costs associated 
with different laws in different regions of the world.  Many observers feel that 
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 implementing a research exemption in countries which do not have the provision would 
also be a beneficial step toward harmonization with other countries which currently have 
such a statute (Dent, Jensen et al., 2006).  In the current situation, where there is little 
uniformity between exemptions in different regions, Cook claims that “[d]isparities in the 
scope of experimental use defenses can, in the long run, be expected to result in the shift 
of research from jurisdictions with a narrow such defense to those with a more permissive 
such law” (Cook, 2004). In this vein, some American commentators have suggested that 
if the U.S. fails to adopt a research use exemption (particularly in light of the narrowed, 
post-Madey experimental use defense) it could lead to increased outsourcing of research 
and a corresponding decrease in U.S. innovative output (Mueller, 2004).   
Specific Legislative Options 
 Should Congress attempt to codify a statutory research exemption, legislators 
could rely on the recommendations of a number of groups, agencies, and commissions, 
both inside and outside the government, in addition to past legislative attempts and 
numerous international examples.  While some of the following options vary significantly 
in scope, they almost universally share the characteristic of being in the category of 
research on exemptions.   
AIPLA 
One legislative option was presented by the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association (AIPLA) at a 2004 meeting of the group’s Board of Directors.  Relying on 
the model articulated by Judge Newman in the Merck v. Integra case, the organization 
ratified a resolution stating that it supported a statutory research use exemption, aimed at 
allowing research on a patented invention (NAS, 2004).  Specifically, AIPLA endorsed 
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 congressional action which would exempt activities performed to:  1) test the validity of 
the patent; 2) study the “features, properties, inherent characteristics or advantages” of 
the invention; 3) investigate new methods of making or using the invention; 4) invent 
alternatives (design-around) (Caltrider and Davis, 2004).    
While the first two prongs of the recommended exemption met with little 
resistance, the last two suggestions worried some constituencies, who were concerned 
that the exemption would significantly erode the rights of patent holders.   The 
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) adopted a resolution opposing 
AIPLA’s recommended exemption.  Mark Crowell, AUTM’s President, explained in a 
letter to Michael Kirk, Executive Director of the AIPLA, that “AUTM is quite concerned 
that the AIPLA proposal…substantially broadens the common law exception to the 
detriment of patent holders, many of whom are U.S. universities and nonprofit research 
institutions who own patents in research and experimentation tools” (Crowell, 2005).  
Citing a lack of compelling evidence that university research was being hindered by fears 
of patent infringement, Crowell stated that “AUTM does not support an effort to seek an 
express research exemption at this time” (Crowell, 2005).   
AAU/AAMC 
 Another recommendation for legislative action comes from a union of 
research/academic organizations led by the American Association of Universities (AAU) 
and the American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC) and others.  In responding 
to proposed bill H.R. 2795, the Patent Reform Act of 2005, AAU and AAMC, among 
others, recommended that the House Judiciary Committee “give careful 
consideration…to inclusion of an experimental research exemption in any patent reform 
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 bill that goes forward” (AAU, ACE et al., 2005).  Although a research exemption had not 
been included in the text of the bill, the academic institutions advised the inclusion of a 
“narrowly crafted exemption” which would “at a minimum allow research…to determine 
whether it functions as claimed, to better understand its operation under various 
conditions, to discover something unknown about it, or, under appropriate circumstances, 
to improve upon it” (AAU, ACE et al., 2005).  However, at present, the recommendation 
has not been heeded and the Patent Reform Act of 2005  (H.R. 2795) does not contain 
any provisions for a research exemption. 
Recommendations from the U.S. government 
 It is not, however, simply lobbying interests or concerned constituencies that have 
recommended specific legislative change in the United States.  Multiple government 
entities and agencies have weighed in on the research exemption question, with most 
favoring a limited, research on exemption.   
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission issued its report “To Promote Innovation:  
The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy” on the role of the U.S. 
patent system in ensuring scientific and technological progress.  While the report 
embraced the notion of a limited research exemption, it admitted that the idea of 
exempting activities aimed at improving the invention or designing around it was a 
potentially highly contentious issue.  The report debated the merits of exempting such 
behavior, claiming that it “poses the most difficult problem, because it affects the 
division of profits between initial and competing follow on innovators, both of which 
need adequate incentives, if their independent contributions are to be sustained” (FTC, 
2003).  Furthermore, the FTC warned against broadening the scope of such a statute to 
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 include research with a patented invention, specifically in the case of research tools:  
“Extending an experimental use defense to infringement arising through use of tools to 
develop unrelated products appears problematic.  Inventors of tools used by researchers 
need an income stream from those who use their inventions” (FTC, 2003).   
 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has also commented on the research use 
question, through its Working Group on Research Tools, a group convened to combat the 
potential research slowdowns associated with the patenting of biomedical research tools.  
In 1998, the group advised that any serious examination of policies designed to alleviate 
the problems of patented research tools should include investigating proposals for a 
statutory “experimental use exemption” (NIH, 1998).  The group cited the typical foreign 
model of the research with/on dichotomy, claiming it was a “sensible distinction” (NIH, 
1998).  The group also cautioned against an excessively broad exemption, which “could 
eliminate incentives for private firms to develop and disseminate new research tools, 
which could, on balance, do more harm than good to the research enterprise” (NIH, 
1998).  
 Perhaps the most vocal proponent of a codified research exemption is the National 
Research Council, which has recommended such legislative action in two separate 
reports.  In the 2004 report, A Patent System for the 21st Century, an NRC committee 
recommended that Congress should pass legislation to “shield some research uses of 
patented inventions from liability for infringement”, although the group admitted that 
“reaching agreement on how this should be done will take time” (NRC, 2004).  In laying 
out the arguments for and against the research exemption, the committee recognized the 
difficulty in formulating the exact scope of the policy, but ultimately concluded that “the 
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 lack of a problem free formulation does not mean that Congress should not consider the 
options and try to craft a second best solution” (NRC, 2004). 
A 2006 NRC report entitled Reaping the Benefits of Genomic and Proteomic 
Research:  Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health echoed the earlier 
call for a research exemption, this time offering a more thoroughly-crafted 
recommendation.  This time, the committee advised Congress to adopt a research on 
exemption, using nearly identical language to the AIPLA proposal:  “Congress should 
consider exempting research…if done to discern or discover:  a) the validity of the patent 
and cope of afforded protection; b) the features, properties, or inherent characteristics or 
advantages of the invention; c) novel methods or making or using the patented invention, 
or; d) novel alternatives, improvements, or substitutes” (NRC, 2006).   However, while 
the recommendation was meant to curb some of the fears of the academic community 
with regard to patent infringement, the committee still stopped short of recommending an 
exemption that would allow for unlicensed use of patent research tools. 
Joyce Brinton, a member of the committee, notes that “there was consensus on the 
committee that having a research on exemption clearly annunciated would alleviate a 
problem, but not the problem that Madey v. Duke points toward” (Brinton, 2006).  The 
recommendation of the research on exemption, Brinton explains, while not as directly 
applicable to concerns of nonprofit researchers, was still seen as a positive reform in the 
eyes of the committee, particularly in terms of harmonization with other countries:  
“Obviously, it’s not the kind of thing in general that a university would be pursued 
about…but it was one that people felt safe in being able to make a recommendation 
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 about, and that would be very similar to the patent laws of other countries” (Brinton, 
2006). 
Stephen Merrill, who staffed the NRC committee and edited the report, claims 
that the recommendation was “mainly proposed as a sort of prophylactic measure rather 
than to solve an immediate problem” (Merrill, 2006).  As far as not recommending a 
research with exemption, Merrill explained that the committee felt “that it would not be 
supported by the patent bar, and secondly, that it would raise questions about the viability 
of firms engaged in developing and marketing research tools, whose business plans might 
be undermined” (Merrill, 2006).  Merrill also noted that the introduction of a research 
with exemption would, far from harmonizing U.S. patent law with other countries, 
overshoot the foreign precedents for an exemption:  “We would be bucking a lot of 
interests [with a research with exemption], including the interest in having a more 
uniform international catalog” (Merrill, 2006).   
 
Analysis 
 So, after examining the legislative options for a codified exemption, which would 
be most appropriate for Congress to consider?  To begin, it appears that the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction is far too difficult to apply, given the current 
climate of academic research and the commingling of “basic” and “applied” experimental 
activities.  Therefore, any exemption proposal should not consider noncommercial status 
of the researcher or organization as a criterion necessary to be protected.  Universities 
have become prime players in the area of genomic discoveries, the acquisition DNA 
patents, and the development of profitable research tools.  To treat them differently 
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 would be ideologically inconsistent with the aims of increasing the overall output of 
innovation.  If that is the goal, then all research entities, whether nonprofit or commercial 
in nature, should be eligible for the exemption.   
 Since the commercial/nonprofit nature of the organization is not the defining 
criterion for defining a research exemption, it appears that the nature of the use is the 
only other logical distinction that can be made.  Specifically, the line can be drawn 
between research performed on the patented invention, and research performed with the 
patented invention.  Most uses falling under the heading of research on appear to be an 
appropriate extension of the enabling disclosure requirement, as they are simply intended 
to verify the claims of the patent or to examine the invention first hand.  These uses 
clearly fall under the scope of Justice Story’s original formulation of the common law 
research use exemption, would not affect the inventor’s financial stake in the invention, 
and would generally be met with little or no resistance.   
 However, two other uses are more controversial:  experiments aimed at finding 
novel uses or finding alternatives to the invention (design-around research).   These two 
options are most problematic because they have the possibility of undermining the 
profitability of the invention, which could erode patent rights and make inventors hesitant 
to invest R&D capital or to patent their discoveries.  However, there are two main 
arguments that appear to trump this fear.  Firstly, in the case of novel uses, if a researcher 
discovers a new use for a patented invention, the inventor is in the prime position to 
capitalize on these new uses because they own the patent, regardless of the use.  For 
example, if a university scientist reveals that a particular drug, created to treat diabetes, 
also cures a certain type of cancer it is the pharmaceutical company, not the researcher or 
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 the university, which will make money off of the new discovery because they own the 
underlying patent.  Moreover, a license to use the original invention would be required to 
sell a service or product embodying the improvement, so the original inventor would 
benefit, even though deprived of revenue during the research phase of the follow-on 
invention. 
Secondly, the best response to the concern over design-arounds appears to be that 
it is exactly the type of activity the patent system is supposed to incentivize.  If the aim of 
patent law is to increase innovative output, then the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) should be primarily concerned with the net number of inventions, not where 
they are coming from.  If research on a patented invention leads to a better mousetrap, so 
be it.  That is the aim of the free market, within the context of the patent system.   
Finally, the argument for harmonization, while not entirely determinative, is a 
compelling reason for legislative action.  Particularly in the area of intellectual property 
law, where there has been so much push by the United States and WTO for uniformity 
across international boundaries, it seems inconsistent that the U.S. would not want to 
bring its policies in line with those of many of our major trading partners in Europe and 
Japan.   
While implementing a research on exemption seems like a beneficial policy from the 
perspective of exempting certain types of innovative research, it would not address the 
main problem facing academic researchers, the potentially detrimental case of patented 
research tools.  The research on activities are not typically the ones about which a 
researcher would be sued, since they don’t threaten the profitability of the patent.  The 
biggest problem of research tools is associated with the research with activities.  In order 
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 to clear up the problem posed by Madey v. Duke, then, the ideal solution would be the 
proposal of a research with exemption, which would alleviate the pressure on academic 
researchers and technology transfer managers.  Without the fear of lawsuits, researchers 
(particularly those working on tight grant budgets) could save money on licenses and 
royalties and ensure access to the required tools.  However, the danger in that kind of 
proposal is that it would eviscerate the value of almost all research tool patents.  Without 
the promise of recouping their initial R&D investments, research tool producing 
companies and universities may be hesitant to invest in new tools, which could, in the 
long run, reduce U.S. innovative output.  Even those entities which continued to develop 
new tools might be reluctant to rely on the patent system for protection, and might instead 
turn to trade secrecy or other methods of “hording” their ideas. 
However, if it could be implemented without significantly undermining the 
profitability of research tools, the research with exemption would likely be a superior 
alternative to the research on exemption.  The problem is that there has been very little 
quantitative examination of the effects of a research exemption of either variety.  Would 
the proposal discourage companies from developing new tools?  As the OECD points out, 
“The ideal conditions under which research exemptions should exist revolve around the 
impact of patenting on investment incentives.  Unfortunately, there are no empirical 
studies which analyze this issue specifically” (Dent, Jensen et al., 2006).  Would a 
research with exemption render research tool patents worthless?  Would the exemption 
proposal, on balance, increase the innovative output in the United States?  Bob Cook-
Deegan claims that in arguments over various exemption proposals, “[t]here is often 
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 more rhetoric than data” (Malakoff, 2004).  The next section of this paper will attempt to 
provide just such data. 
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 Section 5 
Stakeholder analysis of a research use exemption 
 
This section will explore the potential stakeholder and limited quantitative 
analysis of the likely effects of implementing a research use exemption.  Assuming that 
research on exemptions would be unlikely to severely impact the pecuniary interests of 
the patent owner, I will limit my analysis to the outcomes of a research with style 
exemption.  The analysis will be broken into three sections:  first, examining the effects 
of an exemption on universities; secondly, the effects of an exemption on research tool 
companies; and, finally, a political analysis, indicating Congress’ likelihood of action on 
the subject. 
For this analysis, I will assume that the exemption would include only 
noncommercial research (however, a for-profit goal of the sponsoring institution would 
not prevent claims to the exemption), but would shield the use of all biomedical research 
tools.  However, since the main source of data is the annual licensing survey from the 
Association of University Technology Managers, I will concentrate primarily on 
university research.  While the survey only includes 164 university respondents, these 
represent the largest academic research institutions in terms of investment and 
innovation, so it is likely that these data reflect the lion’s share of university innovation 
and research investment.   
A.  Effects of an exemption on university innovation 
Building the model:  costs and benefits 
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 Of course the main benefit of the research exemption outlined above would be to 
ensure unfettered access to research tools for scientists conducting basic research.   This 
should, theoretically, allow researchers to undertake more projects and produce 
knowledge and results that can then bubble up to industrial firms, who can use this 
knowledge to create products, for instance, pharmaceuticals, building on that 
foundational research.  Knowledge flow is particularly valuable to the pharmaceutical 
industry, which relies on publicly supported research to a greater extent than almost any 
other commercial industry.  One study conducted by Wes Cohen found that 58 percent of 
pharmaceutical respondents cited “public research as a source for new ideas”, the highest 
proportion of any industry surveyed, leading the author to conclude that in the drug 
industry, noncommercial research has a “substantial impact on industrial R&D” (Cohen, 
Walsh et al., 2002).  Another survey by Edwin Mansfield found that 31 percent of the 
new pharmaceutical and medical products introduced between 1986 and 1995 “could not 
have been developed (without substantial delay) in the absence of recent academic 
research”, which was the highest rate for any industry surveyed (Mansfield, 1995).  Thus, 
we can see that increased levels of output from academic researchers could substantially 
increase innovative output from pharmaceutical companies, who would have more 
knowledge inputs for their research projects.   
 However, it does not appear that a research exemption would throw open the 
floodgates of basic research.  Firstly, a research exemption would only increase basic 
research outputs to the extent that it would enable projects which are currently being 
delayed or abandoned due to patent concerns.  Therefore, the impact of a research 
exemption depends greatly on the amount of research currently being hampered.  As 
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 suggested by the studies of Walsh, et al. the number of such projects could be very small, 
perhaps just one or two percent of all university research (see page 31).  Even if one 
considers the higher numbers from the Hansen AAAS survey, it appears that only around 
10 percent of researchers have been forced to delay or abandon projects due to patent 
restrictions (see page 30).   
 Secondly, the “linear model” of knowledge flow has become outdated and no 
longer reflects the reality of the research enterprise, particularly in the biomedical 
community.  Whereas universities and nonprofit institutions were the traditional source of 
basic research, companies and other non-university actors have become major players.  
Between 1980 and 1998, the percentage of U.S. basic scientific research conducted by 
industrial enterprises more than doubled from 13.7 to 28.4, and Scherer claims that 
“[i]ncreases in biological research probably played a substantial role in this heightened 
industry attention to basic research” (Scherer, 2002).  In 2000, more than half (57 
percent) of all basic research was carried out in a setting other than universities (Sarnoff, 
2002).  Given this increase in the basic research focus of companies, they may be less 
dependent on university research outputs and more than able to pick up any slack created 
by sagging university knowledge outputs.   
 Another fundamental change that has occurred is the extent to which universities 
are collaborating with commercial firms in research projects.  The percentage of 
academic R&D supported by industry more than doubled in the two decades from 1970 
to 1990 (Cohen, Florida et al., 1998), and in recent years, total industry support for 
university research has topped $3 billion annually, around 8 percent of total research 
expenditures (NAS, 2004).  For fiscal year 2004, the AUTM licensing survey reported 
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 research expenditures from industrial sources were just over $2.5 billion, approximately 
6.8 percent of total research expenditures (AUTM, 2005).  And just as knowledge inputs 
are essential to pharmaceutical input, patent rights are essential to attracting this kind of 
cooperative work between the academic and the industrial world.  One biotechnology 
representative, testifying before the FTC, claimed that “patents are the key asset for us.  
They enable us to have access to capital markets and to continue our innovation and 
development” (FTC, 2003).   
A research with exemption could undermine the robustness of certain classes of 
biomedical patents.  And without the assurance of intellectual property protection, 
companies may be reluctant to enter into joint research with universities.  Joyce Brinton 
cites the potential that, in the absence of strong patent rights, “there would be valuable 
research tools that would not be developed because you can’t get somebody to make the 
investment because they have no proprietary position in the marketplace” (Brinton, 
2006).  It is hard to predict exactly how much research would be affected by a reduction 
in patent protection, but one study by Scherer found that, in their survey sample, 38 
percent of patents jointly held by a university and another entity involved a private 
company as the partner (Scherer, 2002).  Michelle Cai goes so far as to suggest that this 
loss of corporate sponsorship could cause universities to be “worse off if the 
experimental use defense is broadly applied to nonprofit academic research,” because, 
“[m]any of the universities’ own patents could lose exclusivity with respect to other 
academic researchers and their perceived value in the eyes of investors may therefore be 
reduced” (Cai, 2004).   
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  Another area where a research exemption would impact universities would be in 
terms of licensing revenue.  As previously mentioned, universities have become leaders 
in the development and commercialization of genomic research tools and other DNA 
based products.  And many of these have become very lucrative income sources for some 
research universities.  Big winners include the Cohen-Boyer patents on recombinant 
DNA and the Axel patents for cotransformation, both of which have earned hundreds of 
millions of dollars for Stanford and Columbia University, respectively.  Income 
generated from royalties is typically split between the technology transfer office, 
inventors, and the inventors’ departments (NRC, 2006).  John Sandelin, of Stanford, 
explains that among academic departments, these licensing and royalty revenues are very 
useful because “they can be used for anything, whereas a lot of the monies they get in 
from research sponsorship or other forms have restrictions on what they can be used for” 
(Sandelin, 2006).  These funds have also become important for setting research priorities 
for upcoming years.  Sandelin points out that some departments “will ask for estimates of 
what we [the technology transfer office] think the department or the school income will 
be.  So, in some sense, they are planning ahead on what they are likely to spend it on” 
(Sandelin, 2006).  Colyvas notes that “enhancing university revenues, which was not a 
central argument for the policies articulated in Bayh Dole, now clearly is an important 
objective of universities in their patenting and licensing policies” (Colyvas, Crow et al., 
2002).  Since many valuable university patents cover biological research tools, a broad 
research exemption could rob these enterprising institutions of millions of dollars in 
licensing revenues. 
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  An exemption might not reduce university income as much as it may seem.  First 
of all, licensing revenues are not the cash cow they might appear at first glance.  While 
there are a handful of universities who manage to make large profits from their licenses, 
most of these come from a handful of inventions.  A survey by Thursby and Thursby 
showed that “on average, 76 percent of the license revenue reported by universities is 
attributable to their top five inventions” (Thursby and Thursby, 1995).  A 2006 study by 
Pressman, et al. found that only 2 percent of university DNA based patents had been 
licensed more than nine times (Pressman, Burgess et al., 2006).  So, we can see that the 
number of blockbuster patents for universities is tiny. 
 Even the number of universities generating these licensing revenues is relatively 
small.  An analysis of data from the 2000 AUTM licensing survey showed that while 
average licensing income was around $8 million per university, this number was skewed 
by a small number of big earners, as more than half had revenues of less than $824,000 
(Thursby and Thursby, 2003).  Furthermore, these licensing revenues are dwarfed by the 
amount spent by the universities on research.  A 2003 NAE report found that “royalties 
from university patents represented only about 2 percent of R&D expenditures” (NAE, 
2003).  For the 2004 fiscal year, gross licensing income generated by universities 
participating in the AUTM survey was $1.09 billion, just under 3 percent of the $37 
billion spent by those same universities on research (AUTM, 2005).  Statistics like those 
above lead some to conclude that “[u]niversity based technology transfer is not a good 
way to make money,” based, in part, on the example of  MIT, a first class research 
institution whose research expenses top $350 million per year, but whose gross licensing 
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 income was $8 million, with just $3 million of those dollars reaching the departments and 
university directly (NRC, 1997).   
Cost-benefit analysis 
This section attempts to quantify some of these issues into a cost-benefit analysis.  
The benefits of an exemption for universities include: 
♦ the amount of research newly enabled by the exemption (i.e. the 
amount of innovation currently being stifled by restricted access to 
inputs, onerous licensing agreements, and other patent-related 
concerns) [Renabled]; 
♦ money saved because it would not have to be paid to universities and 
other patent holders in the form of royalties [Luniv, Lind].   
The costs of the proposed policy would include: 
♦ Lost licensing revenue paid from universities who use the technology to 
universities who own the patents [Luniv], and; 
♦ Lost industrial sponsorship for research projects [Rlost]. 
So, the equation would appear as follows: f(CBA)= Rgain + Luniv + Lind - Luniv - Rloss.  
Universities would experience a net increase in innovation whenever f(CBA)> 0.   
 
Figure 5.1:  Costs and benefits for universities under the research with exemption  
 
Costs Benefits 
• Lost industrial-sponsored 
research activities 
 
• Lost licensing revenues from 
nonprofit users 
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spent on licensing fees and 
royalties 
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 In order to provide a meaningful equation, all figures must be expressed in terms 
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novative output measured against the current level.  Which innovative output 
should be used to measure?  Patents granted?  Research R&D?  New inventions?  This
analysis will use “invention disclosures” as a measure of innovative output.  While this 
does not correlate precisely with the amount of innovation going on in a university, it 
gives some measure of how many projects are producing potentially patentable outcom
which are viewed by the scientific community as being novel and having some 
innovative significance.  For many of these disclosures, technology transfer offi
ultimately decide not to file a patent application. However, whereas granted or filed 
patents have a significant lag time, invention disclosures correlate better with the wo
which was actually performed in a given fiscal year. Relying on patents issued or 
applications filed would offer a proxy on how much innovative activity went on on
two years prior, because of delays associated with the processing and examination of a 
patent application.   
Since some o
ry to convert these into a number of invention disclosures filed.  In order to do 
this, it is necessary to establish a constant multiplier that links a patent application with
fixed research investment dollar amount.  To provide this number, I used aggregate data 
from the FY 2004 AUTM licensing survey.  In FY 2004, the total respondent U.S. 
universities received 15,002 invention disclosures from researchers, while total rese
expenditures for the year were $37.162 billion for the same group of universities.  
Dividing total research expenditures by patent applications shows an average of $2
million spent on research per patent application.  Using this factor (2.48/patent 
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 application), we can convert the dollar totals into invention disclosures to estimate the 
innovative output in an environment with a permissive research exemption.    
There may be some reservations about the method by which this number was 
chosen a 
 to 
 of 
tion becomes: 
f(CBA) an 
sert numerical values for those terms which 
we kno
be 
                                                
.  After all, its impact on the final analysis could be very large.  The AUTM dat
does not take into account whether the sponsored research activity was in the field of 
genomics or biotechnology.  Accordingly, it could be argued that the funding required
file a patent application in the biomedical sector is much higher than $2.48 million, given 
the expense associated with genomics/health related research.  However, since these 
areas are also the source of many more patent applications, perhaps they are a more 
efficient source of patent application generation, requiring less than the $2.48 million
investment for an invention disclosure.  Therefore, given the uncertainty and apparent 
lack of better alternatives, I will rely on this factor for my analysis.   
Therefore, adding in our investment/innovation ratio, the equa
= Rgain + (Luniv/2.48) + (Lind/2.48) – (Luniv/2.48) – (Rloss/2.48).  However, we c
simplify the equation to reflect the fact that the royalties paid by universities to other 
universities are a transfer, a zero-sum shift in resources, which does not affect the net 
outcome of the equation.22  Thus, these terms can be eliminated, leaving us with simply: 
f(CBA)= Rgain + (Lind/2.48) – (Rloss/2.48).   
The next task in the analysis is to in
w.  Since Rgain represents the percentage of research which is currently being 
stifled, it is a fraction of the total number of patent applications.  Therefore, Rgain can 
 
22 With the exception of a few major inventions, such as the Cohen-Boyer or Axel patents, most of the 
royalties earned by universities from other universities are extremely small, as many institutions do not 
require licensing agreements for use of their products by other universities, and many others do not charge 
a fee.  So, these terms can be viewed as a net transfer or a negligible amount, and, either way, can be 
eliminated. 
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 represented as 15,002x, where x is the percentage of research projects currently being 
abandoned or prevented due to patent considerations.  Lind represents the licenses and 
royalties paid to companies that universities would not pay, given the research 
exemption.  While it may not be a quite realistic assumption, this analysis will a
that in the event of a robust “research with” exemption, universities would have to pay 
ssume 
no 
 
 
ss 
ed to:   
f(CBA)
While we are left with Obviously, since 
g x 
licensing fees to companies for the use of their research tools.  Therefore, L actually 
equals the percentage of total expenditures spent by universities on licenses.  Given the
$37.16 billion spend on research in FY 2004, this quantity could be represented as 
37,162y, where y is the average percentage of total research expenditures devoted to
paying for licenses and royalties.  Finally, the variable R represents the amount of 
industrial sponsorship that would be lost if companies, absent the guarantee of robust 
patent protection, decide not support university research.  Total research support from 
industrial sources, according to the FY 2004 survey, were $2.55 billion.  Therefore, R
could be represented as 2554z, where z is the percentage of industry-sponsored research 
that would be abandoned in the wake of a research with exemption. 
Using the conversions discussed above, our equation is reduc
ind 
loss 
lo
 = 15,002x + (37,162y/2.48) – (2554z /2.48), and simplifies to:  
f(CBA) = 15,002x + 14,984.68y – 1029.84z. 
 three variables, we can set some parameters.  
they are all proportions, x, y, and z must all be between 0 and 1.  However, we can go 
even farther, to see what values of x and y would result in a beneficial outcome.  Settin
= 0, and z = 1, we can see that the upper limit on y is 1029.84/14,984.68 or .069 (6.9 
percent).  Similarly, setting y = 0 and z = 1, we find that the upper bound on x is 
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 1029.84/15,002, also 6.9 percent.  Therefore, if either x or y exceeds 6.9 percent, 
benefit will be positive, and the outcome of the policy will be favorable.  The most 
difficult portion of the analysis comes from assigning values to the three remaining 
unknowns.   
The as
the net 
signing of the z value amounts to little more than speculation, since it is a 
hypoth
RC) has 
tes 
nd 
h 
eviously mentioned, there are also a number of other factors which the 
corpora
, 
 
 
etical conjecture about how firms would respond to a reduction in patent 
protection.  This is particularly difficult given the lack of empirical data on the 
importance of patenting on R&D investment.  The National Research Council (N
commented on the lack of “systematic empirical analysis of the impact of patents on 
innovation,” and recognized that “the narrower question of whether patenting stimula
research and development investment has only recently begun to be studied” (NRC, 
2003).  While patents certainly appear to be a important incentive in biotechnology a
pharmaceutical research (Scherer, 2002), it is unlikely that a significant number of 
companies would immediately stop their corporate sponsorship of university researc
initiatives.   
As pr
te/university interaction besides just profit, and it appears unlikely that companies 
would sever these ties simply because of a reduction in patent rights, especially if they 
would still be able to enforce their tool patents against other corporations.   Additionally
because of contracts and funding obligations, most collaborations could not be terminated
overnight.  Therefore, especially in the short term, z might be very close to 0.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, I will assign z a value of .1, which acknowledges that some 
fraction of companies may seek to end their sponsorship of university research, but the
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 bulk will remain.  With one variable filled in, the equation is now:  f (CBA) = 15,002x +
14,984.68y ─ 103.0 .   
This new equati
 
on allows us to create a new set of parameters for x and y.  This 
time, se
 
x, the amount of research currently 
being a
ey 
or 
 lower bound, I will use Walsh’s estimate of approximately one percent.  
Hansen  
 
4.68y 
─ 103.0, simplifying to f (upper) = 1397.2 + 14,984.68y. 
tting x equal to zero, we see that the equation will result in a new benefit if y is 
greater than .0069, or .69%.  Similarly, setting y equal to zero, we see that x value above
.0068, or .69% will produce a net benefit.  So, how big are x and y likely to be?  Are they 
big enough to produce a net benefit for universities?  
There are conflicting estimate for the value of 
bandoned or halted due to patent and licensing considerations.  The work of 
Walsh and Cohen represents the low end of the estimate, while Hansen’s AAAS surv
could be seen as an upper-limit estimate.  One thing is certain, even the lower estimates 
of x appear to be larger than the .6% threshold, indicating that our analysis will certainly 
show a net benefit for university innovative output.  Therefore, I will use both as 
bookends to gauge the range of the innovative increase which could be expected f
universities.   
For the
’s numbers suggest more researchers have had to abandon or change projects due
to patent considerations, that around ten percent of university bioscience researchers have
experienced difficulties in conducting their research (Hansen, Brewster et al., 2005).  
Inputting Walsh’s one percent estimate into the equation, we are left with f (lower) = 
150.02 + 14,984.68y ─ 103.0, which simplifies to f (lower) = 47.02 + 14,984.68y.  
Conversely, inserting Hansen’s estimate of x = .1 yields:  f(upper) = 1500.2 + 14,98
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  The final piece of the analysis, then, is to determine an approximate value of y, 
the percent of total research expenditures currently devoted to paying licensing fees and 
royaltie
 
le 
of their budgets to paying 
licensin
, 
oyalties.  
ntative 
ately 33 percent of total 
costs ar
A 
                                                
s.  Generating a precise estimate for y across all university research would be a 
very difficult prospect and could be the subject of an entire study of its own.  However, in
this case, I will again find a lower and upper limit for y in order to determine the possib
range of the benefit.  On one hand, Wes Cohen claims that the number is likely to be 
extremely low.  Based on his surveys with researchers, he believes the amount spent on 
licensing fees is “basically zero, with few exceptions.”23   
In order to establish the upper limit for y, I tried to examine research institutions 
who, by the nature of their work, devote a high percentage 
g and royalty costs.  One set of institutions which have these high royalty costs 
are DNA sequencing labs, which use large amounts of patented reagents to perform 
genome sequencing.  Since the cost of each reagent includes a markup to cover royalties
the calculation involves two parts.  The first is to find out the percentage of the 
institution’s budget which funds reagents.  Once this number is known, it could be 
multiplied by the percentage of the price of the product which goes to covering r
Multiplying these two numbers together should produce an estimate of the total 
institution budget which goes to just paying licensing costs.   
I contacted the Baylor Human Genome Sequencing Center, and a represe
from that institution responded with an estimate that approxim
e devoted to supplies/reagents.24  From here, it is difficult to obtain the second 
number, because the center likely utilizes many different licensed products, such as DN
 
23 Email correspondence with Wes Cohen.  August 22, 2006. 
06. 24 Email correspondence with Michelle Rives.  October 20, 20
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 sequencing machines and fluorescent dyes for sequencing, all of which have a different
royalty percentage.  It might be impossible to figure a precise estimate for the royalty 
percentages because they are bundled in the price, and many of the terms are not publicly
available.  Still, based on estimates for the royalty rates of PCR and other genomic 
research tools a reasonable guess for licensing fees on a typical reagent or machine is 
probably in the range of 5-15 percent (NRC, 1997).  Therefore, with a moderate lev
confidence, it seems likely that the highest percentage which universities could be pay
would be approximately 33% x 15% =  4.95%.   
Inserting the estimates of y = 0 and y = .0495 into the lower and upper limit 
equations, respectively, we are left with:  f (lower
 
 
el of 
ing 
) = 47.02 and f (upper) = 2138.94.  
These t n 
 
 
sult of a 
 
wo disparate estimates represent the range of the possible increase in inventio
disclosures we might expect, given the model of the research exemption outlined above.  
This would represent an increase in innovative output of between .31 and 14.3 percent. 
While this is a broad range, it seems safe to assume that the gains would be toward the 
smaller end of the spectrum.  The estimates in the upper limit calculation, particularly 
those based on the expenditures from sequencing centers, seem much higher than would
be expected from the majority universities, at large.  Accordingly, the actual increase 
would likely be well below the ten percent level, and would, perhaps, be much closer to 
the estimate of .31 percent, which would, nonetheless, indicate a net benefit for 
universities.  Therefore, based on this analysis, it appears that universities would 
experience a net, though likely modest, increase in innovative output as a re
research with exemption. 
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 B.  Effects of exemption on research tool companies 
 Of course, the money saved by universities and other nonprofit institutions would 
likely come out of the pockets of patent holders, especially biotechnology and research 
f robust intellectual protection, 
 
ing and 
 become 
n 
ompanies, who rely on licensing revenues 
and sal
ls 
erck 
v. Integra, many commentators have predicted that the broadening of the “safe harbor” 
tool companies.  And without revenues or the promise o
the development of new research tools might slow, which could devastate innovation in 
the long term, especially in the pharmaceutical sector.  One witness, testifying before the
Federal Trade Commission, pointed out that “patent protection will be critical in 
encouraging investment in the next generation of research tools, which might reduce the 
costs and time required for clinical trial phases” (FTC, 2003).  However, a 
counterargument could be that universities have become better capable of develop
commercializing their discoveries (including genomic research tools) entirely in-house, 
without having to rely on industrial production.  Universities have no doubt
better at bringing products to market, but there is some evidence that private companies 
may be more efficient at developing genomic research tools, particularly in the area of 
DNA sequencing methods (Scherer, 2002).   
While impossible to pinpoint the effect of reduced patent protection on innovatio
in this sector, it seems apparent that a research with exemption has the potential to 
severely impact the profits of research tools c
es of their products to fuel further R&D.  Would a research with exemption 
completely devalue these patents and drastically reduce the revenues of research too
companies? 
Luckily, we have been presented with just such a test case.  In the wake of M
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 exemption (as evidenced by the Supreme Court’s decision) would have just the effect o
devaluing res
f 
earch tool patents.  Judge Rader, of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit
f 
t, their 
examin o 
 
ere 
ear 
 e 
’s ruling, such products would likely fall under the safe harbor exemption, 
 wrote that “expansion of § 271 (e) (1) to include the Scripps-Merck activities 
would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning biotechnology tool 
patents.”  In a brief filed on behalf of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation and 
other academic research institutions, Rolf Stadheim warned:  “Should the safe harbor o
section 271 (e) (1) be expanded to include general pharmaceutical research, it is 
inconceivable that such research patents will have any value left” (Stadheim, 2005).   
Given these predictions, and the outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision, 
therefore, we can examine the effects of research tools companies in the wake of a legal 
shift which some claimed would “nullify the commercial value” of their key asse
intellectual property (Stadheim, 2005).  Therefore, this analysis of companies will 
e research tool companies whose patent portfolios include products similar t
Integra’s RGD peptides, and track their stock prices, R&D expenditures, and revenues to
see what effects this de facto, court-induced research with exemption has had. 
This analysis, therefore, attempted to locate research tool companies who w
most likely to be affected by the ruling and examine their performance over the past y
16 months to see if they were, indeed, harmed by this de facto research with exemption.  
Methodology 
The first step in conducting the financial analysis was to locate companies whos
business models rely heavily on their ability to license small molecules that are similar to 
the peptides described in the Merck case and are used in drug discovery.  Based on the 
Supreme Court
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 potentially impacting the ability of these companies to collect licensing revenues on their 
products.  A list of potential companies was generated by using the Delphion patent 
database to search for companies who held patents with similar classifications as the 
patents disputed in the Merck case, as well as companies who held patents which cited 
the peptide patents (USPTO patents:  4,988,621; 4,792,525; 5,695,997; 4,879,237).  
Ultimately, this search produced a list of approximately twenty companies who held 
numerous patents of small molecules that were similar to Integra’s peptides.  These 
companies were then examined, selecting for only U.S., publicly traded companies.  (Th
decision to only select domestic, public companies was made in order to facilitate the
gathering of financial data and stock prices.)  Then, once that was completed, each 
company’s website and annual reports were read to find the companies whose busine
models most heavily relied on their ability to license the small molecules on which they 
owned patents for drug discovery.  Ultimately, this yielded a list of six companies that 
would serve as the “experimental” group:  Sangamo Biosciences, Inc., Medarex, I
Lexicon Genetics Incorporated, ArQule, Inc., Sirna Therapeutics, and ARIAD 
Pharmaceuticals. 
The next step in the analysis was to find a group of research tool groups that sol
products that were not related to peptides or drug discovery.  These would serve as one 
control group, ensuring that trends observed in the experimental group were not mere
reflection of broade
e 
 
ss 
nc., 
d 
ly a 
r trends in the research tool sector as a whole.  In order to locate the 
control group of research tool companies, I started with Hoover’s online financial 
database of companies listed as “Biotechnology Research Equipment”.  Foreign 
companies or private companies would have required laborious efforts to obtain financial 
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 records and convert data into U.S. dollars.  Moreover, their markets might not be U.S.-
based.  Once this list was selected, it produced 22 companies as candidates for the 
group.  From this group, I then chose 10 companies that would serve as the contr
list of 22 companies was arranged alphabetically from 1 to 22, and then 10 numbers were 
selected randomly using an online random number generator.
control 
ol.  The 
ist 
sing this 
 does not directly measure performance, such as 
revenue
ards or 
se are just a few of the things which could affect individual company’s 
stock price.  Additionally, although every effort was made to choose companies most 
                                                
25  This produced a final l
of ten research tool companies to serve as the control:  Alpha Innotech Corporation, 
Applied Biosystems Group, Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc., Illumina, Inc., Immunicon 
Corporation, Incyte Corporation, Invitrogen Corporation, Nanogen, Inc., 
SEQUENOM, Inc., and Tripos, Inc. 
In order to gauge the effects of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the experimental 
research tool companies, the decision was made to use stock price as an indicator of the 
companies’ ability to continue to generate profit.  There are several caveats to u
approach.  Firstly, the use of stock price
.  However, it does offer insight into what observers in the sector feel the 
companies are worth.  Theoretically, if the experimental companies were no longer able 
to generate licensing revenue due to the ruling, this should have been reflected in a drop 
in the stock price, as analysts and investors evaluated the effects of the de facto 
exemption.   
Secondly, a company’s stock price could be influenced by many factors other 
than simply the inability to license these small molecules.  Trouble with board members 
or executives, talks of takeovers or mergers, FDA approvals or denials, patent aw
rejections, the
 
25 www.random.org
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 order to control for market 
 
 each 
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 dependant on small molecule licensing revenues, the companies no doubt have
other revenue streams, which, in some cases, might be able to overcome the loss of 
income from their patented drug discovery research tools.  In the end, however, stock 
price analysis was viewed as the only viable financial data that could be analyzed for 
statistical purposes.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision, only five fiscal quarters have
passed.  Therefore, if the analysis looked at revenue or R&D investment to gauge the 
effects of the ruling, it would only be able to use five data points, too few to make an
statistically significant inferences from the data.   
 In order to collect historical stock price data, my analysis used historical stock 
prices obtained online from the Big Charts Marketwatch database.26  Stock prices were 
collected for each company in the list in bi-weekly increments on Wednesdays, beginn
with June 1, 2005 (just before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Merck v. Integra was 
released) and ending with September 20, 2006.  In
fluctuations in the entire biotechnology sector (not just research tools), historical prices
for the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index [NBI] (which consists of over 120 biotech 
companies) were also gathered.  All prices were normalized to account for stock splits.  
Once all of the stock prices were collected and entered into a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet, the percent change from the June 1, 2005 price was calculated for
company for each week.  Then, the percentage changes were averaged for the 
experimental and control research tool groups, and plotted along with the percentag
change in the NBI.  
Results 
 
26 http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/historical/
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  Figure 5.1 shows the results of the first plot, examining the percent cha
stock price from the June 1, 2005 price.  The x-axis represents time in two week 
increments (i.e. time
nge in 
 number “2” represents four weeks because it is comprised of two, 
 periods).  The y-axis represents the percent change from the 6/1/05 price, for 
age 
change 
two-week
the experimental and control research tool groups, the percent change reflects the aver
change of all companies in the group, while the NASDAQ line is just the percent 
in the NBI.   
Figure 5.1:  Stock prices 6/1/05 through 9/20/06 
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Originally, the theory advanced by some observers was that this ruling would 
have serious consequences for companies like the experimental group, who would lose a 
key revenue source.  However, if this was the case, it certainly does not appear to have 
affected the stock price after the ruling.  As is evident in the graph, the research tool 
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 compan  
or, if 
ice:  
alyze this 
 back to the 
 
ies with patents most similar to those involved in the Merck case have actually
outperformed both the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index and the control research tool 
companies for almost the entire past fifteen months.  This appears to suggest that the 
ruling and the de facto exemption has had little negative impact on these companies, 
it did affect their licensing of small, protein based molecules, they were able to 
compensate for the loss in revenue through sales in other business units.   
 However, there is another possibility with regards to an impact on the stock pr
perhaps the market anticipated the Court’s decision and the correction in the stock price 
actually occurred prior to the release of the opinion in June 2005.  In order to an
possibility, stock prices were gathered for all companies and the NBI going
beginning of 2005, starting with January 12 of that year.  Again, these prices were 
recorded and averaged for each group and the percentage changes from January 12, 2005
were plotted along with the NBI.  Figure 5.2 shows the changes in stock price from 
January 12, 2005 to September 20, 2006.   
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Figure 5.2:  Stock Prices 1/12/05-9/20/06 
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 A look at this graph reveals a slightly more nuanced view of the potential effects 
of the Supreme Court’s decision.  Time period twelve marks the point at which the 
decision was released, and it is clear that prior to this time period, the experimental group 
had underperformed with respect to the control research tool group and the NBI.  
Specifically, the experimental group shows a downturn between time period eight and 
eleven, during a period when both the NBI and other research tool companies 
experienced a net increase in stock price.  It is interesting to note that time period seven 
on the horizontal axis corresponds to the point at which the Merck case was argued 
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 before the Supreme Court.  It seems safe to assume that if there were going to be a 
correction in the stock price prior to the release of the decision, it might occur w
range, after the case was argued, but before the opinion had been formally released.  
Anxious investors might have reacted negatively to the oral arguments or simply bec
worried about the possibility of the cases outcome just prior to the release of the opi
 To more closely analyze this segment , we can zoom in on the time period in 
question.  Figure 5.3 shows the changes in stock price from five months prior to the 
release of the decision to six months after.  
Figure 5.3:  Stock prices five months before and after Supreme Court decision 
ithin this 
ome 
nion.   
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Again, time period seven corresponds to the date the case was heard, while time period 
twelve approximates the date on which the opinion was released.  It is clear that within 
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 this timeframe, the experimental groups did, indeed, decrease more than either control 
group.  However, the analysis required some quantitative description of how much more 
the experimental groups decreased and whether this change was statistically significant.   
 To see if these variations are statistically significant, a one- and two-sample t-tests 
were performed.  This was based on input from research assistants at the Statistical 
Consulting Center at Duke’s Institute of Statistics and Decision Sciences, which 
suggested that this statistical test would be appropriate for comparing the stock price data 
over a time series.  The goal of performing these tests was to determine whether or not 
the declines in the experimental group were significantly different from the normal 
fluctuations experienced by the control groups.   
Four separate tests were run, utilizing two different time periods.  The first test 
compared the changes in price of the experimental group to the change in the NBI 
between January 12, 2005 and June 15, 2005.  The t-test confirmed that the changes in 
the two groups were significant at the 1% level (t = -3.991 with 5 degrees of freedom).  
Test two compared the experimental group with the control research tool group over the 
same time period.  In this case, quantitative analysis showed that the change in the 
experimental group, as compared to the control group of research tools, was not 
statistically significant (t= .298 with 5 degrees of freedom, .40>p>.25). 
The other two tests compared the experimental with the control groups between 
January 12, 2005 and May 18, 2005 (time period nine).  This second date was chosen 
because it was between the oral arguments and the Supreme Court’s decision, and, 
therefore, should have provided a good opportunity to gauge any potential effects of 
investors selling off in anticipation of the ruling.  The first test for this time period 
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 compared the experimental group to the NBI.  Again, results were significant, allow
me to reject the null hypothesis at the .5% level (t
ing 
 = -4.586 with 5 degrees of freedom).  
Howev
led 
d by 
ly 
eases in the 
compan
 
 
 
d 
er, when it came to comparing the experimental group with the control research 
tool group, the results were not statistically significant.  The two-sample t-test revea
that we could not reject the null hypothesis at the traditional 5% level (t= .40 with 5 
degrees of freedom, .40 > p > .25).  Therefore, based on the analysis, it appears that the 
experimental research tool companies did undergo a decrease prior to the release of the 
Merck decision that was significantly different from normal fluctuations experience
the overall biotechnology sector.  However, since the results were not significant
different from the control research tool group, it is possible that the decr
ies with Integra-like patents were simply a reflection of declines in the wider 
research tool industry of the biotechnology sector. 
Based on these statistical analyses of stock price, it appears that the de facto 
research use exemption handed down by the Supreme Court in Merck v. Integra may,
indeed, have given investors the impression that the decision would threaten firms’ 
ability to generate revenue in the post.  Admittedly, however, the declines in stock price 
occurred before the decision was released, and I must remind the reader that since the 
decision was released, the stock prices of the experimental research tool companies have
outperformed other research tool companies, as well as the NASDAQ Biotech Index as a
whole.   
Additionally, the fact that these companies have increased instead of the predicte
decrease could be due to a number of factors, most notably the fact that the Supreme 
Court’s decision may not have had the assumed of effect of establishing a research 
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 exemption at all.  Since the Court’s opinion with regard to the scope of a research us
exemption is simply dicta and not law (indeed, the court intentionally sidestepped the
issue of the exemption for research tools entirely), it is possible that companies have n
changed their behavior at all in the wake of the dec
e 
 
ot 
ision.  The more reliable method for 
gauging ntal 
, 
C.  Political Analysis
 the impact of the decision would be to analyze the revenues of the experime
research tool companies.  However, as mentioned previously, it is likely too soon to 
observe trends in revenues and to be able to analyze them with any statistical 
significance.  Ultimately, I must conclude that the results of the stock price analysis are 
inconclusive.  Therefore, it is difficult to extrapolate and predict, based on this analysis
the quantitative effect that a research with exemption would have on research tool 
companies. 
 
 
 
 Of course, all the talk of a research exemption is contingent on the willingness of 
Congress to take up patent reform legislation and the ability of a majority to pass a 
proposal.  At this point, the prospects seem dim.  There are two principle reasons.  
Firstly, is the unlikelihood of patent reform to receive considerable attention from 
Congress.  Traditionally, patent reform has been viewed as a low priority, and without a 
sufficient compelling reason for immediate reform, patent legislation has tended to fall by 
the wayside.  One need only look at the failed 1991 Kastenmeier patent reform bill.  
Despite passing out of the House Judiciary committee with broad, bi-partisan support, the 
bill ultimately failed to even come before the full House of Representatives for a vote.  A 
similar fate appears to have befallen H.R. 2795, the Patent Reform Act of 2005.  
Introduced in June 2005, the bill was sent to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, 
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 and Intellectual Property and was the subject of two separate hearings.  However, since 
that time, no further action has been taken.  The House Judiciary committee of the 
Congress, em
109th 
broiled in legislation concerning illegal immigration, border security, 
onstitutional amendments, federal court jurisdictions, NSA wiretapping investigations, 
nd other urgent matters, appears to have bumped patent reform to the back of the line.   
 The second reason for pessimism toward a statutory research exemption is the 
small chance that an exemption would be placed in any patent legislation, even if were 
able to gain congressional support.  Congressional patent reform proposals have included 
what many members consider to be essential reforms, which are mostly non-
controversial.   Given the contentious debate over research exemption proposals, some 
staffers and observers see any research exemption as a deal killer.  Steve Heinig of the 
AAMC points out that “the feedback we’re getting from the Hill is that in order to get 
patent legislation to pass, which everyone agrees is important, they’re going to have to 
strip the bill [H.R. 2795] down to some very essential reforms, and this [the research use 
exemption] may not make the cut as an essential reform” (Heinig, 2006).   
There are two main reasons that the research exemption would prove 
controversial.  The first reason is the absence of evidence that university and academic 
research is truly being stifled in the absence of a statutory exemption.  As discussed 
previously, the fears that many had regarding a “chilling” effect on scientific research 
have simply not materialized. The NRC concluded that “[r]ealistically, the likelihood that 
Congress will pass research-exception legislation in the absence of compelling 
circumstances is small” (NRC, 2004).  Steve Merrill claims that a major push for 
congressional action would require a significant shift in firm behavior:  “I think there 
c
a
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 would have to be some serious attempts to stop infringement, either by threat
or with some frequency that universities found potentially threatening” (Merrill, 2006). 
Secondly, the realities of political lobbying appear to be working against the pus
for a statutory research exemption.  On one hand, the influential groups whose influenc
would probably be necessary to push an exemption proposal (such as the AIPLA) have 
not aggressively pursued the issue as part of their lobbying efforts (Merrill, 2006).  
Furthermore, the university community (including AUTM, and other intere
s of lawsuits 
  
h 
e 
sted 
organiz e need for 
kes it 
   
 
 
ations) have not been able to reach a consensus on the form, or even th
an exemption.  On the other hand, the commercial interests who would be most 
negatively impacted by a statutory exemption, namely research tool companies and 
pharmaceutical firms, appear united in their opposition to reform.  According to 
Weschler, the absence of a cohesive coalition lobbying for the exemption, coupled with 
the “immense political power possessed by large pharmaceutical companies ma
unlikely that a statutory change will be made in the near future” (Weschler, 2004).
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 Section 6 
Findings and Recommendations 
 
 
Findings 
1. Patenting of biotechnological research tools does not appear to be negatively 
impacting academic research. 
Based on both the literature performed in this area and my interviews with 
embers of the academic and tech transfer community, it seems that most of the fears 
about the negative impacts of research tool patents are largely unfounded at this point.  
The work of Cohen and Walsh suggest that bench scientists are still not particular 
mindful of patents, nor are they experiencing nificant delays in their research due to 
concerns over patent considerations, even in the wake of the Madey decision.  Even if 
one accepts the data collected by Stephen Hansen and AAAS, the numbers appear to be 
rather low compared to the entire research enterprise.  Additionally, the interviews with 
embers of the university technology transfer community and observers at NRC and 
AAMC suggest that there is not a gre  that biotech patents are stifling 
research currently.  The overwhelming sentiment seems to be that a problem certainly 
could arise at som reseeable 
future.  
 
m behavior does not appear to h ve shifted substantially in the wake of 
 
idence that companies have changed their 
behavior or are more likely to pursue litigation against universities in the wake of the 
 
m
 sig
m
at deal of concern
e point, but that the current situation is tenable for the fo
2. Fir a
Madey v. Duke. 
Similarly, there appears to be little ev
 102
 Madey  firms 
t, it 
p 
3. A research with exemption would likely cause a net increase in university 
clear. 
Based on the quantitative cost-benefit analysis in this paper, it appears that 
universities would likely benefit from a research with exemption in terms of innovative 
output.  While it is true that universities would experience some loss of industry-
sup t
censing fees and royalties for their use of patented inventions and the opening up of 
previously unavailable lines of research.  Given this scenario, it seems that universities 
would be in a position to increase their invention disclosures somewhere in the range of 
.3 to 14.3 percent, although likely trending toward the lower end of the estimate.  The 
impact on research tool companies is much less certain.  The results of the stock price 
analysis (which was, by its design an imperfect gauge of the effects of an exemption), 
were inconclusive and were unable to directly link a change in stock price to legal 
changes which should have mimicked a research with exemption.  
 
decision.  The interviews with representatives from universities suggest that
have an interest in maintaining friendly relations with universities and that industry 
norms would discourage filing suits against academic institutions or researchers.  Quite 
simply, even if companies have the legal ability to sue universities for infringemen
does not appear as if they have the desire.  Again, while most observers agree that the 
potential exists for industrial norms to change, most seem to believe that the relationshi
between the university and industry is dynamic, and will be able to adapt to most 
challenges with extralegal, mutually beneficial solutions. 
 
innovative output, although the effects on research tool companies are less 
 
por ed research, the loss of these research dollars would be offset by the savings on 
li
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 4. The likelihood that Congress will implement any research use exemption is 
 
very small, unless there is a dramatic shift in the academic research climate. 
Given the current political climate in Washington, it appears that patent 
legi
future.  Additionally, any patent legislation which does reach the floor is likely to not 
include  there 
t 
ies, 
, 
 of 
nt 
g, 
slation is simply not enough of a priority to be addressed by Congress in the near 
 a research exemption, which is viewed as too controversial, especially when
are good, relatively innocuous changes to the patent code which are more pressing.  Mos
of this can simply be traced to the lack of cohesion among the various constituenc
even among those who support an exemption, in principle:  AIPLA, AAU, AAMC, NIH
individual universities, and legal scholars.  Ultimately, however, it is probably the lack
urgency which makes a research use exemption politically unfeasible.  If firms were to 
suddenly shift their behavior, or biotechnology patents suddenly began holding up 
valuable research, then congressional action might appear more likely.  However, abse
these changes in the status quo, the odds of Congress even considering, let alone passin
such legislation, appears slim. 
 
Recommendations 
1. Congress should adopt a research on exemption.  Specifically, the exemption 
b. Uses designed to test the claims of the patent disclosure;  
d. Research designed to discover novel uses for the invention. 
e 
should cover: 
a. Both commercial and non-commercial activities; 
c. Research aimed to “design-around” the invention, and; 
 
There are a number of benefits to adopting this type of a legislative option.  Th
statute itself would help clear up the ambiguity surrounding the status of the common law 
research exemption and would provide more direction to university tech transfer offices 
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 and companies about which types of behavior could be carried out without fear of 
infringement suits.  And while there may not be a huge danger of U.S. companies moving 
offshore to find more accommodating research exemptions, this statute would bring 
American patent law into harmony with most of our major trading partners with respect 
to an exemption.  The specific provisions of the statute also offer advantages to 
researchers in both sectors. 
The lack of distinction between commercial and noncommercial is key.  As 
mentioned in Section 4, attempting to exempt only noncommercial work would be 
inconsi t with the aims of the patent system and would require extremely difficult and 
.  Exempting activities aimed at verifying the patent claims is a non-
con
Parts C and e met with some 
apprehensi  s found in 
urope and with the overall aims of the patent system, which is to spur a net increase in 
innovat
h 
tant 
ded 
rch Council.  Admittedly, the research exemption suggested 
sten
delicate line-drawing
troversial provision and is just an expansion of the enabling disclosure requirement.  
 D, as mentioned previously in Section 4, would likely b
on.  However, these provisions are consistent with the exemption
E
ive activity.   
In terms of why a research on exemption is preferable to a research with 
exemption, there are several advantages in the approach outlined above.  The first is that 
it does not pose a significant threat to companies who own patents.  Most uses whic
would fall under the scope of the exemption would not have commercial purposes which 
threaten the commercial viability of their inventions.   However, perhaps most impor
is the fact that this is the most politically feasible option facing Congress, given its 
relatively non-controversial nature.  A similar option has already been recommen
twice by the National Resea
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 above d y in 
one 
 
monitor the climate of biotechnology research and the impacts of patenting 
 
pears to be little evidence that biotechnology patents are stifling 
researc blems is 
 
3. Congress should investigate the possible impact of a research with exemption. 
Ultimately, even an exemption such as the one I have proposed is unlikely in the 
absence of a major shift in firm behavior or a dramatic increase in the impact that patents 
are having on academic research.  Based on the current climate of research in the United 
States, however, both of these seem rather unlikely for the time being.  Still, Congress 
oes little or nothing to address the main concerns of the academic communit
the wake of the Madey decision, but the legislation could also serve as a stepping st
for further congressional action, should it become necessary.  With this form of an 
exemption in place, it would likely be easier for Congress to expand on it if the research 
climate changes dramatically, perhaps expanding to include research with the patented 
invention.    
2. Organizations such as the AAMC, AAU, NRC and NIH should continue to
and firm behavior. 
While there ap
h in the way once feared, it is clear that the development of significant pro
still a possibility.  Additionally, while this report found that firm behavior has not 
changed significantly since the Madey case, the potential certainly exists for a shift in 
behavior to occur, perhaps suddenly.  Organizations from the federal government and 
academic research community should continue to monitor the situation to ensure that 
these problems are not negatively impacting biomedical research.  The committees 
formed by the National Research Council and the AAAS are an excellent way to keep
tabs on the research climate, especially insofar as they directly survey bench researchers 
to get the ground-level view of the effects of patenting on scientific. 
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 mu e
willing y measures to protect the research that is at the backbone of 
our nat  
our 
e 
te 
ai and Eisenberg, 
2003).   
 
Ultimately, it is Congress’ responsibility to live up to its constitutional duty by 
“promot[ing] progress of science”.  In order to do this, legislators must carefully weigh 
the balance between legal structures which offer exclusive proprietary rights and those 
which permit the open dissemination of knowledge and materials.  A limited research use 
exemption, as I have proposed above, seems like an appropriate step, which is consistent 
with the aims of our patent system.  However, before implementing more drastic changes 
to patent code, Congress must be sure to survey the research climate and maintain 
sufficient respect for the patent rights which has, in part, allowed the U.S. to lead the way 
throughout the biotechnology revolution. 
st b  prepared to act in the event that universities do face increased pressure and be 
 to adopt the necessar
ional scientific enterprise.  To this end, Congress should charge the NRC, Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), or other entity with exploring the potential economic 
impact of a research with exemption.  As bad as it would be to have no exemption 
prepared, the effects of a poorly-constructed policy could be even more detrimental to 
national innovative output, by impacting the companies, which invest more heavily in 
biomedical R&D.  Arti Rai beautifully sums up this argument with a word of warning 
about the impropriety of hasty and overly broad changes:  “Given that overall privat
investment in biomedical R&D today exceeds public funding, the strong belief of priva
sector investors that patents are essential to their profit expectations urges caution in 
changing the underlying legal rules that support these investments” (R
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